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This Article uses the Supreme Court's 2011 decision in Bruesewitz v. W yeth
LLC to examine the textualist, or "plain meaning, " approach to statutory
interpretation. For more than a quarter century, Justice Scalia has successfully
promoted textualism, usuallv associated with conservatism, among his
colleagues. In Bruesewitz, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, and his
liberal colleague Justice Sotomayer, in dissent, both employed textualism to
determine if the plaintiffs, whose child was allegedly harmed by a vaccine, could
pursue common law tort claims or whether their remedies were limited to those
available under the no-jault compensation system established by the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Despite these Justices' common approach to
statutory interpretation, they reached diametrically opposite conclusions in
opinions that dissected the statutory language and quarreled over the meaning
of "even though" and "if" clauses. In contrast, Justice Brever employed a
purposive, or "purposes and objectives, " approach to statutory interpretation.
Rather than obsessing over the meaning of each and every phrase, Justice
Breyer looked at Congress's goals in passing the Act. He recognized that
Justice Scalia' conclusion was correct, not because of the supposedly "plain"
meaning of specific language, but because this interpretation was the only one
that enabled the alternative compensation system to function as Congress
envisioned. Other scholars have analyzed Bruesewitz as a preemption case, but
despite statutory interpretation's inherently decisive role in express preemption
cases, this is the first Article to highlight Bruesewitz as an illustration of the
emptiness of textualism.
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1. INTRODUCTION
How to interpret a statute has long been a vexing question. Put bluntly, the
Supreme Court has oscillated over the years between two schools of thought.
One school purports to look only at the plain meaning of the statutory language
to find meaning; the other construes the law in light of the purpose that Congress
sought to achieve. Although advocates of the former, "plain meaning"
approach claim that it reduces judicial discretion,3 it is evident that it does not.
The opinions in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC illustrate this problem. Although
literalism is associated with conservatives such as Justice Scalia, in Bruesewitz,
Justice Scalia and the liberal Justice Sotomayor reached opposite results6 while
1. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Next Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990).
2. See id.
3. See, e.g., id. at 654 (describing Justice Scalia's belief that "legislative history should not
be consulted (except in cases of absurd results and, possibly, of ambiguity), as something of a
prophylactic rule to cabin the discretion of judges").
4. 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011).
5. E.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Note, "Plain feaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of
Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 401, 401 (1994).
6. Compare Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1082 (majority opinion) (holding that the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act preempts design defect claims against vaccine manufacturers), with
id at I 100-01 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's decision to bar all design
defect claims against vaccine manufacturers is one that Congress should make).
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both were purportedly applying the plain meaning rule.7 In contrast, Justice
Breyer sought to determine the reason or purpose that motivated Congress to
adopt the law. In doing so, he considered why Congress concluded that a no-
fault compensation system offered a better approach to the handling of vaccine-
related injuries than did traditional tort law.9 In short. Justice Breyer thought
seriously about a difficult problem. Justices Scalia and Sotomayor, on the other
hand, used shortcuts that led them not to think about the problem at all.
In 1992, six-month-old Hannah Bruesewitz developed residual seizure
disorder and developmental delay after receiving her third dose of the diphtheria-
pertussis-tetanus (DPT) vaccine manufactured by Lederle Laboratories. 0  Her
parents were unable to receive compensation from the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program (NVICP). a no-fault compensation system for vaccine-
related injuries and deaths, because her conditions were not identified as ones
that were compensable.12 Her parents then filed a tort claim against the
manufacturer in state court, but in Bruesewitz v. Wfyeth LLC,14 the Supreme
Court held that the National Childhood Vacine Injury Act (NCVIA) preempted
Hannah's tort claims. The majority in Bruesewitz, led by Justice Scalia,
applied the plain meaning rule of statutory construction to find that the "plain"
language of the Act preempted Hannah's design-defect claims. 16 Justice
Sotomayor, writing in dissent, applied the same textual theory, yet she reached a
completely different conclusion. In other words, Justice Sotomayor did not
believe that the "plain" lanqage of the NCVIA preempted Hannah from seeking
recovery in the tort system.
Justice Scalia claims that the plain meaning rule is the most principled
method of statutory interpretation because it forces judges to uphold the letter of
the law.19 Scalia argues that the text alone is the only true indicia of
7. See id at 1075-80 (majority opinion) (citations omitted); id at 1086-93 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted); see also infra Part III.A (discussing Justice Scalia's majority opinion
and Justice Sotomayor's dissent).
8. See id. at 1082-83 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also infra Part IV.D (discussing Justice
Breyer's concurrence).
9. See id.
10. See id. at 1074-75 (majority opinion) (citing Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233.
236 (3d Cir. 2009)).
I. See 42U.S.C. §300aa-10 (2006).
12. See Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 237 (citing Bruesewitz v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human
Servs.. No. 95-0266V. 2002 WL 31965744, at *13-17 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 20, 2002)).
13. See Bruesewiitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1075.
14. 131 S. Ct 1068.
15. See id at 1082.
16. See id at 1075-80 (citations omitted).
17. See id. at 1086-1101 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
18. See id. at 1101.
19. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER. READING LAW: TiHE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (analyzing the textualist method of interpretation). For a
biting critique of the views expressed in Reading Law; by a leading conservative jurist who echoes
the views expressed in this Article, see Richard A. Posner, The Spirit Killeth, but the Letter Giveth
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congressional intent.20 Looking outside the statutory text to legislative history,
according to Justice Scalia, promotes unprincipled judicial subjectivity, which he
likens to "entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the
guests for one's friends."2
If, as Scalia argues, the plain meaning approach is the most straightforward
indicator of legislative intent, then both he and Justice Sotomayor should have
reached the same result in Bruesewitz; however, they reached opposite
conclusions.22 This Article suggests that it is not unusual to reach inconsistent
results when using the so-called plain meaning rule. In fact, ever since Justice
Scalia joined the Supreme Court and be an promoting his agenda, n such plain
meaning debates have become common.2
The alternative to textualism and the plain meaning rule is Justice Breyer's
purposive or functional approach to statutory interpretation.2 Breyer, who leads
26 rsaaprahtasekthe fight against Scalia's interpretive ideology. supgorts an approach that seeks
to identify and follow the purpose of the statute. Rather than attempt to
interpret statutory language in a vacuum as Justice Scalia does,28 Justice Breyer
seeksfirst to understand Congress's goals in passing a particular statute.2 After
Life, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 2012, at 18 (book review); Richard A. Posner. The Incoherence of
Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.tr.com/airticle/magazine!
books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism (book review).
20. See nfra notes 59-61 & 76-82 and accompanying text.
21. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
22. Compare Brueseiitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1082 (holding that the NCVIA preempts design defect
claims against vaccine manufacturers), with id. at 1100-01 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority's decision to bar all design defect claims against vaccine manufacturers is one that
Congress should make).
23. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the
"Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776 1806. 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 992 n.4 (2001)
("Those associated with conservative causes, like Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook, are leading
theorists ofthe new textualism .7... ).
24. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies ofJustices Scalia
and Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the I'isconsin State Courts, 80 MARQ. L. REV.
161, 180-81 (1996) (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 528 29 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)) (discussing a case involving a debate between Justices over the use of statutory
interpretation and legislative history); see also infra Part 111.3 (providing examples of such
debates).
25. See Ken I. Kersch, Justice Brever's Mandarin Liberty, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 759, 771
(2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005)).
26. See Dortzbach, supra note 24, at 182 ("While other justices have defended the use of
legislative history, Justice Breyer is seen as having the greater role of acting as the new
counterweight to Justice Scalia's textualism.").
27. See id. at 169 (citing Stephen Breyer, On the Uses ofLegislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992)).
28. See generally Eskridge, Jr., supra note I, at 623 (describing how Justice Scalia does not
think the Court should look to legislative history if there is an apparent plain meaning).
29. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068. 1083-84 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted) (showing how Justice Breyer began by analyzing Congress's motive
behind legislation).
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uncovering the purpose of the legislation, Justice Breyer then interprets the
statutory language in a manner that fulfills these goals.3o
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Bruesewitz demonstrates the
advantages of discarding Justice Scalia's plain meaning approach in favor of
Breyer's functional theory.3 Breyer realized that Scalia and Sotomayor had
reached inconsistent results using the same method of interpretation. Instead of
obsessing over the meaning of each and every statutory word, as Scalia and
33Sotomayor did, Breyer first looked to Congress's goals in passing the NCVIA.
After placing the text within its proper legislative context, he concluded that
Congress intended to preempt state law design-defect claims.
We believe the Court should adopt Justice Breyer's analysis. To understand
why the plain meaning rule should be abandoned in favor of the purposive
approach, we provide a brief overview of both methods in Part II of this Article.
With an understanding of these interpretive theories in mind, in Part III, we
begin by discussing the conflicting plain meaning results of Justices Scalia and
Sotomayor in Bruesewitz. At the end of Part III, we argue that conflicting
interpretations have become increasingly common since Justice Scalia was
appointed to the Court in 1986. Part IV analyzes Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion by considering, as he did, how the way in which an alternative no-fault
compensation plan works inherently leads to the correct interpretation of the
statutory language at issue in Bruesewitz.
Finally, we contend that Justice Breyer's approach to statutory interpretation
resolves the frequent interpretive conflicts that arise when the plain meaning rule
is applied. Too many inconsistent opinions have been authored on the basis of
Justice Scalia's incoherent theory. The Court should ensure that Bruesewitz is
the last opinion to suffer from this flaw; it is time to abandon the conservative,
plain meaning rule in favor of Justice Breyer's functional alternative.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Although Bruesewitz features two conflicting opinions purporting to apply
the plain meaning rule, one written by a liberal Justice and the other by a
conservative Justice, the doctrine is more commonly associated with
conservatives. In a 1983 law review article on statutory interpretation, Judge
Posner noted: "It is not an accident that most 'loose constructionists' are political
30. See, e.g., id. at 1085-86 (citations omitted) (applying Congress's purposes to
interpretation of the legislation).
31. See id. at 1082-86 (citations omitted).
32. See id. at 1082 83.
33. See id. at 1083-84 (citations omitted).
34. See id. at 1085-86 (citations omitted).
35. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and
Statutorv Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 669, 674 (2005).
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liberals and most 'strict constructionists' are political conservatives. The former
think that modern legislation does not go far enough, the latter that it goes too
far. Each school has developed interpretive techniques appropriate to its
political ends."36 Posner made this claim nearly thirty years ago, but his astute
observation still rings true today. In fact, this ideological split between liberals
and conservatives is most readily apparent among the nine Justices of the United
States Supreme Court.
Conservative Justices, led most prominently by Justice Scalia., approach
statutory interpretation through the narrow lens of the plain meaning rule. This
approach, also known as "textualism," 3 looks primarily to the statutory text to
uncover its "plain meaning." 40  Textualists rarely, if ever, look seriously to
legislative history documents for evidence of Congress's intent.1  Textualism, of
course, is not inherently conservative; indeed, the liberal Justice Sotomayor used
textualism in her dissent in Bruesewitz.42 Nevertheless, textualism seems to lend
itself to the limited style of government that conservatives favor.4
In contrast, proponents of the practical alternative, such as Justice Breyer,
seek to interpret the statutory text in a manner that is consistent with the purpose
of the legislation.44 To uncover Congress's goals in passing the legislation,
liberal Justices, unlike their conservative counterparts, properly look beyond the
text to legislative history documents. The purposive or practical approach to
36. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Inteipretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom. 50
U. CHi. L. REV. 800, 822 (1983).
37. E.g., Robert Barnes, Term Saw High Court Move to the Right: Roberts-Led March Likely
to Continue, WASH. POST, July 1, 2009, at Al.
38. See, e.g., McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 35, at 674 ("In recent years, judicial
conservatives champion ain approach to statutory interpretation labeled 'textualism,' that is, fidelity
to the so-called plain meaning of legislation."): see also Eskridge, Jr., supra note 23, at 992 n1.4
("Those associated with conservative causes, like Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook, are leading
theorists of the new textualism ... ).
39. Throughout this Article, we use the term "plain meaning' and "textualist"
interchangeably.
40. See McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 35, at 674.
41. See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr., supra note 1, at 623 (describing how Justice Scalia, a textualist,
has "criticized the Court for relying on legislative history to confirm or rebut the apparent plain
meaning of a statute").
42. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1088 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting);
see also infra Part III.A.2.
43. See Paul Killebrew. Where Are All the Left-Wing Textualists?, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895.
1899-1900 (2007). A comparison could be drawn with another favorite conservative interpretive
ideology, "originalism," although originalism can lead to activist results. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706. 713 (1999) (finding sovereign immunity using an originalist approach even though
the Eleventh Amendment provided no textual support). See generally R. Randall Kelso, Statutory
Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial
Decision-making, 25 PEPP. L. REv. 37, 41-64 (1997) (detailing the history of statutory
interpretation in this country).
44. See Dortzbach, supra note 24, at 169 (citing Breyer, supra note 27).
45. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices' Reliance on Legislative
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Efkct, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 120 & n.6
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interpretation is based on the notion that legislators who pass a law are
46addressing a specific problem or set of problems. The mission of the faithful
interpretive court under that theory is to interpret the law so as to address the
problem.47 A literalist such as Justice Scalia, however, is interested only in what
he perceives the language to say.
A. The Interpretive Problems in Bruesewitz
Bruesewitz v. Wy)eth LLC is interesting for any number of reasons. One such
reason is its use-or rejection-of legislative history to interpret the NCVIA.
Both the liberal Justice Sotomavor and the conservative Justice Scalia used the
plain meaning rule for statutory interpretation in Bruesewitz to reach opposite
results despite their ostensible use of the same methodology.49 The two opinions
are fascinating because they show that the plain meaning, literalist approach does
not necessarily lead to an easy, nonideological result.
In contrast, Justice Breyer used a more functional approach, the "purposes
and objectives" theory of statutory interpretation.50  Although we argue that
Breyer's approach is the better of the two methods) it is important to have a
general understanding of both theories before delving into the particulars of each
Justice's opinion. Therefore, the next two Sections briefly summarize the
conservative plain meaning rule and the functional theory Justice Breyer
espoused.
B. The Plain Meaning Rule
1. A Brief Overview
The plain meaning rule generally stands for the proposition that the meaning
of a statute can be revealed through a simple examination of the statutory
(2008) (finding that between 1969 and 2006 the "liberals Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
Blacknun, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer--rely on legislative history as a group far more
often than their ... conservative counterparts"); David S. Law & David Zaring, Law IVersus
Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use ofLegislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653,
1659 (2010) ("[T]he propensity of Justices to cite legislative history is significantly correlated with
the ideology of the Justices themselves: liberal Justices are more likely than conservative Justices to
use it.").
46. See Breyer, supra note 27, at 858.
47. See id. at 853.
48. Cf Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068. 1075-82 (2011) (citations omitted)
(illustrating the fact that the majority does not use legislative history in interpreting the NCVIA and
explicitly rejects the dissent's use of it).
49. See id. at 1075-80 (citations omitted); id at 1086-93 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
50. See id. at 1083-86 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
51. See uifia notes 314 51 and accompanying text.
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language.52  In 1917, the Supreme Court pronounced what has become the
traditional articulation of the plain meaning rule in Caminetti v. United States.53
The Court explained that "[w]here the language is plain and admits of no more
than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which
are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."5 Thus, judges applying the
plain meaning rule mustfirst look to the language of the statute. If the statutory
language is unambiguous, then the court should enforce the statute according to
its plain, or ordinary. meaning.f' On the other hand, if the statute is ambiguous,
then courts are permitted to use external sources, such as legislative history,56 to
help guide their interpretation of the statute.
Proponents of the plain meaning approach claim that the rule furthers the
democratic process. Unlike legislative history, which is not law, the statutory
text becomes law through the proper constitutional channels of bicameralism and
presentment. 59  Therefore, the only instrument entitled to constitutional
deference is the actual statutory language. The statute itself, not legislative
52. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHA-MIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRiCTION § 46:1 (7th ed. 2007) (citations omitted).
53. 242 U.S. 470 (1917). In Caminetti, the Supreme Court interpreted a provision of the
White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, which made it a crime to "knowingly transport ... in
interstate ... commerce ... any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or for
any other immoral purpose." Id at 482, 488 n.I (quoting White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395,
§ 2. 36 Stat. 825, 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2006))). Several
defendants had been convicted under the Act for transporting their mistresses across state lines. See
id. at 482-84 (citing Diggs v. United States, 220 F. 545, 559 (1915)). On review in the Supreme
Court, the defendants pointed to the legislative history, which indicated that the Act was intended to
prevent the interstate transportation of women for prostitution. See id. at 484-85. Therefore, the
defendants argued that the prohibition did not apply to them because they did not transport their
mistresses for commercial gain. See id. The Court rejected defendants' proffer of legislative
history because there was "no ambiguity in the terms of [the] act," which prohibited the defendants
from transporting the women for "an immoral purpose, to wit, becoming a concubine or mistress."
Id. at 485-86. Thus, the Court affirmed the defendants' convictions based on the plain meaning of
the statute without the need to resort to external aids. See id. at 485, 496.
54. Id at 485 (citing Hamilton v. Rathbone. 175 U.S. 414 421 (1899)).
55. See id. (citing United States v. First Nat'1 Bank of Detroit, 234 U.S. 245. 258 (1914);
United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1914); Bate Refrigerating
Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 33 (1895); Lake Cnty. v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670, 671 (1889)).
56. "Legislative history" is a particularly broad term. Some commentators have noted that
the phrase encompasses "almost anything that casts light upon what Congress attempted to do when
it enacted a statute." Eskridge, Jr., supra note 1, at 626. Thus, the phrase includes committee
reports, statements made in committee hearings, and statements made on the floor. See id
57. See Caminetti. 242 U.S. at 490 (citing Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486. 495 (1904):
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Manning, 186 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1902); Bate Refrigerating Co.,
157 U.S. at 41-43; Blake v. Nat'l Banks, 90 U.S. 307, 319 (1874)).
58. See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr., supra note 1. at 654 (explaining Justice Scalia's belief that "t]he
only legitimate statutory law is that wvhich has been approved by both chambers of Congress and by
the President").
59. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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history, is the primary indicator of legislative purpose.60 The text, according to
Justice Scalia., is the only true unified voice of Congress because:
Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between
Congressmen are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of a
law and its presentment to the President. It is at best dangerous to
assume that all the necessary participants in the law-enactment process
are acting upon the same unexpressed assumptions.61
Finally, many fear that the use of legislative history promotes unbridled
judicial subjectivity.62 As law and economics scholar Judge Easterbrook once
warned, the expansive legislative record allows a "court [to] manipulate the
meaning of a law by choosing which snippets to emphasize .... [It] offers wilful
6^judges an opportunity to pose questions and devise answers .... Justice
Scalia shares that fear, reasoning that neither judges nor practitioners should be
allowed to undermine the plain language of a statute and emphasize only those
parts of the legislative history that are favorable to their position.64
2. Justice Scalia's "Textualist" Approach to Statutory Interpretation
"Justice Antonin Scalia hates legislative history."65 Scalia endorses a strict
application of the plain meaning rule known as textualism.66 As a textualist,
Justice Scalia will not consider legislative history even to "confirm the apparent
meaning of a statutory text." Since joining the nation's top bench in 1986,
60. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 1, at 649 (quoting Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the
Use ofLegislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375).
61. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation
omitted) (citing Thomnpson, 484 U.S. at 84-85); see also Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust
Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The law is what the law says, and we
should content ourselves with reading it rather than psychoanalyzing those who enacted it.").
Notwithstan ding these attacks, critics of the plain meaning rule have argued that the approach
has many interpretive fallacies of its own. See, e.g., Karkkaien, supra note 5, at 476 ("[A] statute's
plain meaning is often an interpretive conclusion reached only after a series of difficult and
controversial interpretive choices are made-choices of what rules to apply, what evidence to admit,
what dictionary definitions to invoke."). For example, while the rule purports to cabin judicial
discretion, opponents claim that judges must make a number of subjective decisions to reach the
conclusion that a particular statute has a "plain," or common, meaning. See id.
62. See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: [he
Untold Story ofHoly Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1885 (1998).
63. In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340. 1343 (7th Cir. 1989).
64. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
65. JOSEPH L. GERKEN, WHAT GOOD Is LEGISLATIVE H-ISTORY? JUSTICE SCALIA IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 1 (2007) ("Justice Antonin Scalia hates legislative history. That is
only a slight oversimplification." (emphasis added)).
66. See id. at 2.
67. Eskridge, Jr., supra note I, at 623.
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Justice Scalia has not shied away from asserting his textualist ideology.68 For
example, in the spring of 1987, shortly after his appointment to the Supreme
Court, Justice Scalia issued an opinion in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca69 in which he
criticized the majority for relying on legislative histor1 to support its
interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. o
In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court was faced with the task of deciding whether
a Nicaraguan citizen was eligible for asylum under section 208(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 1 Section 208(a) authorizes the Attorney
General to grant asylum "to an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his
home country 'because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race. reli ion. nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." The Court, led by Justice Stevens, rejected the
government's contention that an alien needed to prove that he was "more likely
than not to be subject to persecution" to receive asylum. Instead, the Court
found that the language clearly supported a "well-founded fear" standard.74
After engaging in a textual analysis, the Court also determined that the
legislative history verified "the plain language of the Act.
Although Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's textual argument, he
concurred in the judgment because the majority did not adhere to a strict plain
meaning approach." In his view, after finding that the text was clear, the Court
should not have examined the legislative history. 7 Justice Scalia explained:
Although it is true that the Court in recent times has expressed approval
of this doctrine, that is to my mind an ill-advised deviation from the
venerable principle that if the language of a statute is clear, that
language must be given effect-at least in the absence of a patent
absurdity. 8
68. See id.
69. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
70. See id. at 452-53 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting id. at 448 (majority
opinion)); see also Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1537 (2006)) (providing the Act at issue in this case).
71. See Cardoza-Fonseca. 480 U.S. at 424 (citing Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212.
§ 208, 94 Stat. 102, 105 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006)), Immigration and
Nationality Act § 243(h)).
72. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Refugee Act § 201 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42))).
73. Id. (citing Refugee Act § 208(a); Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h)).
74. See id. at 430 (citing Refugee Act § 208(a); Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h)).
75. See id. at 432.
76. See id. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citing id. at 432-43 (majority
opinion)).
77. See id. (citing id. at 432 43 (majority opinion)).
78. Id.
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Because the language was clear, argued Justice Scalia.,79 the Court had fulfilled
its interpretive duty and was "not free to replace [the language] with an
unenacted legislative intent. 80
Justice Scalia's opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca provided a glimpse of what
was yet to come. According to Scalia., if the statutory text is clear, the analysis is
over; "do not pass go, do not collect $200."8 His strict adherence to the plain
meaning rule continues to guide conservatives.
C. The Purposive or Functional Approach
On the opposite side of the interpretive spectrum are the liberal Justices, led
by Justice Breyer, who advocate an approach to statutory interpretation that
focuses on the legislature's purpose in adopting the legislation. This
interpretive method has an ancient and impeccable lineage.84  In 1584, for
example, the Court of the Exchequer stated:
[F]or the sure and true interpretation of all statutes ... four things
are to be .. . considered:-
[] 1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
[] 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common
law did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved ...
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all
the Judges is always to make such [] construction as shall suppress the
mischief, and advance the remedy ... .5
In other words, a court should consider the evil, or mischief, that the law
sought to correct, and then the court should interpret the law so as to eradicate
that evil.86 There is nothing here to suggest that a court should look solely to the
79. See id.
80. Id. at 453.
81. This phrase is a popular-culture reference to the board game Monopoly (2006 Hasbro).
See About Monopoly, IASBRO GAING, http://www.hasbro.comimonopoly/enUS/discover/about.
cm (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
82. See McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 35, at 674.
83. See generally Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 45, at 119-20 (discussing attempts to
ascertain the purposes or intentions of legislation); Law & Zaring, supra note 45, at 1659 (declaring
the influence of political ideology on use of legislative history).
84. See generally Eskridge, Jr., supra note 23, at 998-99 (describing how English judges, as
early as 1500, went outside the language of statutes and used nontextualist approaches in
interpreting them).
85. Heydon's Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 7 b (citations omitted). It
is interesting that Justice Scalia-as devoted to history as he claims to be--does not seem to have
grappled with this history of interpretive methods employed by the great common law judges of
England.
86. See id. (citations omitted).
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plain language of the statute and not consider the purposes that led to the
adoption of the law.
Justice Story, in his great treatise on constitutional law, was of like mind:
"[T]he reason and spirit of the law, or the causes, which led to its enactment, are
often the best exponents of the words, and limit their application.87
The Supreme Court has long recognized this approach to interpretation.
After the Court's 1917 decision in Caminetti v. United States, for example, the
plain meaning approach remained the dominant theory of statutory interpretation
for the next twenty years. 89 In 1940, however, the Supreme Court ushered in a
new era of statutory interpretation jurisprudence when it issued its decision in
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns.90 In American Trucking, a group of
truckers and common carriers sought an injunction requiring the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate the qualifications and hours of service
of all employees in the motor carrier industry, not just those employees whose
jobs affected public safety. 91  The Court was asked to determine who was
considered an "employee" under section 204(a) of the Motor Carrier Act.
Because the statute did not define "employee," the Court turned to the legislative
history and concluded that Congress did not intend for the ICC to have the
authority to regulate all employees-rather, only those employees "whose
activities affect[ed] the safety of operation."
The holding, however, was not the most influential component of the
Court's decision. Instead, it was the Court's discussion of legislative history94
that turned the tide of statutory interpretation jurisprudence for the next forty
years. Significantly, the Court explained the propriety of relying on legislative
history to uncover congressional purpose, reasoning that "[w]hen aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there
87. 1 JOSEPH STORY. CONaIENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 400
at 384 (Cambridge, E.W. Metcalf & Co. 1833) (citing I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*61).
88. 242 U.S. 470 (1917). For a discussion of the Court's use of the plain meaning approach
in Cam inetti, see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
89. See Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and
Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (1975)
(quoting United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929)).
90. 310 U.S. 534 (1940). See also GERKEN, supra note 65, at 57-65 (citations omitted), for
ain overview of the Supreme Court's use of the plain meaning rule between the Court's 1917
decision in Cainiretti and its 1940 decision in American TruckingA ss'ns.
91. See Am. Trucking.4ss'ns, 310 U.S. at 541 (citing Motor Carrier Act, 1935, ch. 498, sec.
204(a), 49 Stat. 543, 546-47 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 31502 (2011)); INTERSTATE
CONaIERCE CONal'N. RULES OF PRACTICE BEFORE THE CO-NflSSION Rule XV (1922)).
92. See id. at 542 (quoting § 204(a)(2), 49 Stat. at 546). Under § 204(a)(1) and (2), the ICC
could regulate the "qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees." § 204(a), 49 Stat.
at 546 (emphasis added).
93. See id. at 553. In particular, the Court noted that the "committee reports and the debates
contain no indication that a regulation of the qualifications and hours of service of all employees
was contemplated; in fact, the evidence points the other way." Id. at 547-48.
94. See id. at 542-44 (citations omitted).
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certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words
may appear on 'superficial examination."'95 No longer was the Court limited to
the four corners of the statute. Instead, it was free to examine any sources that
aided the interpretive process, even if the statutory language had an apparently
plain meaning.
Many believed that the legislative history era, beginning with the Court's
opinion in American Trucking, came to an abrupt end in 1986 when Justice
Scalia was appointed to the Supreme Court.96 As demonstrated throughout his
opinion in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 9 Justice Scalia is unwilling to use
legislative history for anything, even to confirm his own "plain" interpretation.
For those jurists who endorsed the purposive approach, it appears that their
search for congressional purpose had taken a back seat to Scalia's conservative
agenda. Indeed, by the early 1990s, it seemed likely that Justice Scalia's
textualism had spread like wildfire, even among those members of the Court
who had previously favored the use of legislative history. 98 As one commentator
explained, those Justices "who[] have from time to time endorsed the use of
legislative history-now regularly produce textualist opinions that look very
much like those written in the workshops of Justices Scalia and Thomas." 99
In 1994, however, the purposive approach to statutory interpretation was
saved from its im ending doom when Justice Breyer was appointed to the
Supreme Court.lo Justice Breyer, viewed by many as the liberal
"counterweight" to Justice Scalia, made it clear that he would stand up to the
conservative jurist. o0 Indeed, even before Justice Breyer joined the Court, he
clearly articulated this point. 102
95. Id. at 543-44 (quoting Helvering v. N.Y. Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 465 (1934); Bos. Sand
& Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928)).
96. See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr., supra note 1, at 656-57 (1990) (stating that since Justice Scalia
has been on the Court, "the Court is now somewhat less willing to refer to legislative history");
Thomas W. Merrill. Textualisin and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351,
365 (1994) (recognizing that "in any case in which another Justice needs the vote of Justice Scalia
to form a majority or controlling opinion ... he or she will lose majority status" if legislative history
is employed); cf Alan Schwartz, The New Textualisn and the Rule of Law Subtext in the Supreme
Court's Bankruptcy Jurisprudence. 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 149, 155-59 (2001) (focusing on the
exclusion of legislative history as the defining feature of the new textualism).
97. See 480 U.S. 421, 452 55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
98. See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr., supra note 1, at 656 ("In each year that Justice Scalia has sat on
the Court ... his [textualist] theory has exerted greater influence on the Court's practice."); Merrill,
supra note 96, at 365 (discussing how more Justices began endorsing the use of legislative history
after Justice Scalia joined the Court).
99. Merrill, supra note 96, at 365.
100. See Dortzbach, supra note 24, at 169 (citing Breyer, supra note 27).
101. See id. at 182 ("While other justices have defended the use of legislative history, Justice
Breyer is seen as having the greater role of acting as the new counterweight to Justice Scalia's
textualism.").
102. See generally Breyer, supra note 27 (illustrating his viewpoints in an article promoting
legislative history published before joining the Court).
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In 1992, while serving as the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, Justice Breyer published his well-known law review article entitled,
On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes.103 There, he
promoted the use of legislative history as an aid to uncover congressional
purpose.104 Justice Breyer asserted that "[a] court often needs to know the
purpose a particular statutory word or phrase serves within the broader context of
a statutory scheme in order to decide properly whether a particular circumstance
falls within the scope of that word or phrase."105
Essentially, then-Judge Breyer was pointing out a fundamental difference
between the two dominant approaches to statutory interpretation. Unlike the
plain meaning rule, the inquiry into purpose does not view the statutory language
in complete isolation; instead, it provides the necessary legislative context,
which is then used to put "meat" on the bare statutory bones.
Justice Breyer's support for a purposive approach to questions of
interpretation can be traced directly to the famous and vastly influential work by
Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, The Legal Process. 106 The book mocks
the plain meaning rule, and especially the Caminetti decision, for their
simplicity. 17 Instead, Hart and Sacks cogently and powerfully make the case for
a comprehensive approach to interpretation, one that tries to place the language
of the statute in context, giving due consideration to the relevance, competence,
and probative value of legislative history (defined very broadly).108
Hart and Sacks summarize their approach to questions of interpretation in
this way:
[T]he object of interpretation of a statute is to determine the
meaning ... and
[s]ince meaning depends upon context; and
... [A]ll aspects of the internal legislative history of a
statute ... are part of its context-
103. Id
104. See id. at 853-54.
105. Id. at 853.
106. HENRY M. HART. JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS. THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
The Legal Process had a long gestation period and was originally "published" in mimeograph form
in 1958. See Erwin N. Griswvold, Preface to id, at vii. For many years, all 1.400 plus pages of it
circulated in that unwieldy form. See id at vii-viii. Finally. Professors William N. Eskridge, Jr.
and Philip P. Frickey polished and republished it. See id. at ix. Eskridge and Frickey's introduction
to The Legal Process contains a lengthy history of the ideas found in the book. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in
HART & SACKS, supra, at li-cxxxy (citations omitted).
107. See HART & SACKS, supra note 106, at 1211-12, 1238-43 (citations omitted).
108. See id. at 1253-54.
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All such aspects may be directly relevant in determining the
meaning which ought to be attributed to the statute. 109
Hart and Sacks, in other words, favored a contextual and nuanced method of
looking at questions of interpretation.' 1 They would have been horrified at the
simplistic approach Justice Scalia adopted. Both Scalia and Breyer were at
Harvard Law School in the 1960s during the heyday of the Legal Process
School.'' One has followed the Legal Process School, and one has not. It
would be fascinating to trace the reasons behind their individual responses to the
Hart and Sacks model of interpretation. The divergence may not be more
complicated than gravitation to the interpretive method that is most likely to lead
the writer to a desired result: It simply may be easier to manipulate simplistic
doctrines than nuanced ones.113 On the other hand, the preferences may have
deeper roots.
Rejection of the plain meaning rule is not necessarily a liberal trait. however.
Judge Henry Friendly, for example, a noted conservative jurist, had short shrift
for the doctrine. '4 Additionally, Judge Learned Hand, perhaps the most famous
federal circuit judge of the twentieth century, and also a conservative, wrote
what is perhaps the most quoted damnation of the rule: "There is no surer way to
misread any document than to read it literally ... 1."1 Nevertheless, the plain
meaning rule has come to be associated with current-day conservatives.
III. "PLAIN MEANING" AND INCONSISTENT RESULTS
Although the plain meaning approach appears to be the most straightforward
approach to statutory interpretation, this philosophy can often lead to
inconsistent results. The debate between the majority and dissent in the Supreme
109. Id. at 1253. The Hart and Sacks method of interpretation is laid out more carefully later
in the book. See id. at 1374-80.
110. See id. at 1374-80.
111. See Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 106, at c cxiii (citations omitted); THE SUPREME
COURT HISTORICAL SOC'Y, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-
1995, at 512, 537 (Clare Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995). One of the authors of this article (Bill
Reynolds) was also at Harvard Law School during that time and taught for many y ears a course
based on The Legal Process; he is an ardent follower of the Hart and Sacks methodology.
112. See, e.g., Kelso, supra note 43, at 38, 39-40 (1997) (recognizing that Justice Scalia's
"New Textualism" approach is a clear alternative to the Legal Process School and that "Breyer
clearly reject[s] the New Textualism model").
113. For example, literalists tend to rely on dictionaries-and to pick aind choose what
dictionaries are used. See Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in
Claim Construction. 59 FLA. L. REV. 333. 368 (2007) (citing Joseph Scott Miller & James A.
Hilsenteger, he Proven key: Roles and Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts,
54 Am. U. L. REV. 829 app.B, tbl.5 (2005)).
114. See DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF His ERA 187 (2012)
(quoting Giuseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608. 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., concurring)) (citing
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAw 66-67 (1984)).
115. Giuseppe, 144 F.2d at 624 (Hand, J., concurring).
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Court's recent decision in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC highlights the inconsistent
application of this purportedly "plain" theory. 116
A. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC: The Case
After receiving her third dose of the DPT vaccine on April 1, 1992, six-
month-old Hannah Bruesewitz began experiencing seizures. 117 Shortly
thereafter, Hannah was diagnosed with residual seizure disorder and
developmental delay. 18Hannah still suffers from both conditions, and doctors
predict that they will continue to affect her for the rest of her life.1 19
In 1995, Hannah's parents, seeking redress for their daughter's condition,
which they believed to be vaccine-related,120 followed the administrative
procedures set forth in the NCVIA121 and filed a petition for compensation
through its no-fault system.122 The special master found that Hannah was not
entitled to compensation because her conditions were not listed in the NCVIA's
Vaccine Injury Table. 123
After Hannah was denied compensation in the no-fault regime, her parents
sued Wyeth in state court,124 claiming that the vaccine's defective design caused
Hannah's alleged harms. The case was removed to federal court, and a judge
granted Wyeth's motion for summary judgment. holding that Hannah's design-
defect claims were preempted by the NCVIA.l26 On appeal, the Third Circuit
116. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1075-82 (2011) (citations omitted); id. at
1086-1101 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
117. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2009).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. This belief has been challenged by numerous studies showing no link between childhood
vaccines and neurological illnesses. See, e.g., Michael J. Smith & Charles R. Woods, On-Time
Vaccine Receipt in the First Year Does Not Adversely AfAect Neuropsychological Outcomes, 125
PEDIATRICS 1134, 1140 (2010) ("[R]eceipt of vaccines during infancy has no effect on
neurodevelopmental outcomes 7 to 10 years later.").
121. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3 00aa-1 to -34 (2006).
The NCVIA established a no-fault compensation regime for vaccine-related injuries or deaths
through the NVICP. See id. at §§ 300aa-10 to -15.
122. See Bruesewitz. 561 F.3d at 237 (citing Bruesewitz v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., No. 95-0266V, 2002 WL 31965744, at *1 (Fed. C1. Dec. 20, 2002)).
123. See id. (citing Bruesewitz, 2002 WL 31965744, at *13-17). See 42 C.F.R. § 100.3
(2011), for a current listing of the vaccines and related injuries that are covered under the NVICP
no-fault compensation regime.
124. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1075 (2011). Wyeth did not actually
manufacture the vaccine. The vaccine was manufactured by Lederle Laboratories, Wyeth's
predecessor in interest. See id.
125. See id. Specifically, the Bruesewitzes claimed that Wyeth was both negligent in failing
to produce a safer vaccine and strictly liable for a design defect. Biruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 237.
126. See id.
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affirmed the district court's decision. rulino that the Bruesewitzes' claims were
"expressly preempted by the Vaccine Act."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether section 22(b)(1)
of the NCVIA preempted Hannah Bruesewitz's design-defect claims against
Wyeth.128 The Court engaged in a detailed linguistic analysis of the preemption
language found in section 22(b)(1),1 9 which states:
No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for
damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with
the administration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988, if the injury or
death resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even though the
vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper
directions and warnings.10
After examining the statutory text, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
held that section 22(b) () preempts all state law design-defect claims against
vaccine manufacturers. 2 As such, Hannah Bruesewitz was not entitled to any
compensation for her injuries.
Justice Breyer, who wrote a concurring opinion, agreed that the NCVIA
preempts design-defect claims.m1 4 However, unlike the majority. Breyer reached
this conclusion by looking at the purposes behind the NCVIA.
Justice Sotomayor wrote an energetic dissentl36 in which she accused the
majority of "impos[ing] its own bare policy preference over the considered
judgment of Congress."13 In her view, section 22(b)(1) protects vaccine
manufacturers from civil liability for design defects only if the manufacturer can
127. Id at 255-56.
128. See Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1072 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (2006)).
129. See id at 1075-78 (citations omitted).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1).
131. See infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Scalia's
majority opinion in greater detail.
132. See Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1082. A design defect is any "unreasonably dangerous"
product hazard that exists even wvhen the actual product causing an injury conforms to the
manufacturer's own design specifications. See DAVID G. OWEN. PRODUCTs LIABILITY LAW 34, 37
(2d ed. 2008); see also infra notes 146 54 and accompanying text (discussing Scalia's analysis of
design-defect claims).
133. See Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1082.
134. See id at 1082 83 (Breyer, J., concurring).
135. See id To be sure, Justice Scalia briefly scanned the structure and legislative history of
the NCVLA. See id at 1078-82 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). However, Scalia simply
used the structure to reinforce his main textual argument and pointed to the legislative history in
response to the dissent's reliance on it. See id. (citations omitted). Justice Breyer's opinion, on the
other hand, was primarily based on policy grounds. See id. at 1083-86 (Breyer, J., concurring). See
also infra notes 314-41 and accompanying text for further discussion of Justice Breyer's opinion.
136. See infra notes 155-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Sotomayor's
dissent in greater detail.
137. Brueseiitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1086 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
237
HeinOnline  -- 64 S. C. L. Rev. 237 2012
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
demonstrate, in each action, that a plaintiffs injury could not have been
prevented by a feasible alternative design.1 1 In short, Sotomayor would have
preempted only a small subset of all design-defect claims.13 9
1. Justice Scalia' Majority Opinion
In his majority opinion,140 justice Scalia predictably applied the plain
meaning approach to reach the Court's holding that section 22(b)(1) of the
NCVIA preempts state-law design-defect claims against vaccine
manufacturers.141 Justice Scalia began his analysis by setting forth the statutory
text at issue.142 He then focused on the "even though" clause of section
22(b)(1), 1 3 which states that "[n]o vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil
action for damages ... if the injury or death resulted from side effects that were
unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was
accompanied by proper directions and warnings."'14
Justice Scalia argued that the "even though" clause clarifies the word
"unavoidable," which immediately precedes the clause.145 He then asserted that
the plain meaning of the statute dictates that when a vaccine is properly
manufactured and is accompanied by proper warnings, "any remaining side
effects, including those resulting from design deftets, are deemed to have been
unavoidable." 1 6  Assuming proper warnings and manufacture, Justice Scalia
therefore claimed that the manufacturer could not be held civilly liable for
injuries caused by the vaccine's defective design because this was an
unavoidable side effect of the vaccine. 14 Thus, Scalia argued, the NCVIA
expressly preempts state-law design-defect claims against vaccine
manufacturers. 148
138. See id at 1093.
139. See id
140. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito joined Justice
Scalia's majority opinion. Id. at 1071 (majority opinion). Justice Kagan did not take part in the
decision. Id. at 1072. Justice Kagan recused herself, presumably due to her prior work as Solicitor
General. See Robert Barnes, V'accine 1akers Are Protected from Suits, Supreme Court Rules,
WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2011, at A2.
141. Brueseiitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1075-82 (citations omitted).
142. See id at 1075 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (2006)).
143. See id.
144. § 300aa-22(b)(l) (emphasis added).
145. See Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1075.
146. See id (emphasis added).
147. See id.
148. See id Justice Scalia also claimed that if the NCVIA did not preempt state-law design-
defect claims, then the use of the word "unavoidable" would add nothing to the plain text of the
statute because a vaccine's adverse side effects "could always have been avoidable by use of a
differently designed vaccine." Id Therefore, argued Justice Scalia, the use of the word
"unavoidable" "plainly implies that the design itself is not open to question." Id. at 1076.
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Justice Scalia also noted that although section 22(b)(1) explicitly preserves
liability for two products liability claims-failure to warn and manufacturin
defects t49_he statute does not explicitly preserve any design-defect claims.
Applying the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Justice Scalia
claimed that the statute "failred] to mention design-defect liability 'by deliberate
choice, not inadvertence."'" Although Congress could have preserved all three
products liability claims, it chose not to; thus, according to Justice Scalia,
design-defect claims are preempted by the NCVIA.154
2. Justice Sotomavor's Dissent
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Sotomayor also a lied the plain meaning
approach in her dissenting opinion in Bruesewitz. Unlike Justice Scalia.,
however, Justice Sotomayor did not believe that section 22(b)(1) preempted all
design-defect claims; rather, she believed that vaccine manufacturers are exempt
from some design-defect claims.156 Specifically, Justice Sotomayor would have
held that section 22(b)(1) preempts state law design-defect suits only upon a
149. See id. at 1076 (quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149. 168 (2003)). In
fact, both the majority and dissent agreed that section 22(b)(1) preserves liability for failure to warn
claims and manufacturing defects. Compare id. at 1075 (finding that design-defect claims are
preempted "[p]rovided that there was proper manufacture and warning" (emphasis added)), with id.
at 1087 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("[A] vaccine manufacturer in each civil action [must]
demonstrate that its vaccine is free from manufacturing and labeling defects to fall within the
liability exemption of § 22(b)(1).").
150. See id. at 1076 (quoting Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 168).
151. "[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other .'..." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009).
152. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1076 (quoting Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 168).
153. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998)
(providing the three types of claims). The Restatement lists three categories ofproduct defects: (1)
manufacturing defects, (2) design defects, and (3) failure to warn defects. See id.
154. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1076 (quoting Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 168). Even the most ardent
proponent of the plain meaning rule cannot resist buttressing his argument. After concluding his
plain meaning analysis, Justice Scalia also explained that the structure of the CVIA reinforced his
textual interpretation of section 22(b)(1). See id. at 1078-82 (citations omitted). Scalia explained
that design-defect liability promotes two goals: "prompting the development of improved designs"
and "providing compensation for inflicted injuries." Id. at 1079. Justice Scalia argued that the
NCVIA achieves these same goals because it instructs the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(IHS) to explore new "means of improving vaccine design" and it establishes a no-fault
compensation scheme. See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3 00aa-27(a)(1) (2006)). That instruction
demonstrates Congress's deliberate decision not to preserve design-defect liability; instead, it
"reflects a sensible choice to leave complex epidemiological judgments about vaccine design to
the . . . National Vaccine Program rather than juries." See id. at 1080.
155. See id. at 1086-88 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Ginsburg
joined Justice Sotomayor's dissenting opinion. Id. at 1086.
156. See id. at 1088.
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showing that no feasible alternative design could have reduced the vaccine's
negative side effects. 157
Justice Sotomayor's textual analysis focused on the "if' clause of section
22(b)(1),' 8 which states "[n]o vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil
action for damages ... if the iiwy or death resulted from side ejfcts that were
unavoidable even though the vaccine was pro erly prepared and was
accompanied by proper directions and warnings."I Sotomayor agreed with
Scalia that the phrase "side effects that were unavoidable" includes side effects
caused by a vaccine's design. 160 Justice Sotomayor argued that the use of the
conditional term "if' "plainly implies that some side effects stemming from a
vaccine's design are 'unavoidable,' while others are avoidable."16 1  In other
words, section 22(b)(1) sets forth an additional condition before vaccine
manufacturers are exempt from civil liability for design defects: Not only must
the manufacturer prove that the vaccine was free from manufacturing and
warning defects, it must also prove that the "particular side effects of a vaccine's
design were 'unavoidable."1 6
Justice Sotomavor next analyzed the NCVIA's legislative history to
.16^determine the scope of the term "unavoidable." 1 She pointed to the House
Energy and Commerce Committee Report, which stated:
The Committee ... intends that the principle in Comment K regarding
'unavoidably unsafe' products, i.e., those products which in the present
state of human skill and knowledge cannot be made safe, apply to the
vaccines covered in the bill and that such products not be the subject of
liability in the tort system. 164
157. See id. at 1093.
158. See id at 1087.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
160. See Brueseiitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1087 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Scalia
noted this agreement in his majority opinion. See id at 1076 (majority opinion) ("We agree with
[the dissent's] premise that 'side effects that were unavoidable' must refer to side effects caused by
a vaccine's design." (quoting id at 1087 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting))).
161. Id. at 1087 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia disagreed with this "second step" in
the dissent's reasoning. See id. at 1076 (majority opinion) ("We do not comprehend, however, the
second step of its reasoning, which is that the use of the conditional term 'if . .. 'plainly implies
that some side effects ... are unavoidable, while others are avoidable.'" (quoting id. at 1087
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
162. See id at 1087 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
163. See id at 1088-93 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 1088 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, pt. 1, at 26 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6367) (emphasis added). Scalia accused the dissent of ignoring unfavorable
portions of the legislative history. See id. at 1081 (majority opinion). In particular, the report
instructs those who cannot prove a manufacturing defect or a failure to warn claim to "pursue
recompense in the compensation system, not the tort system." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at
26, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6367).
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Based on this report, Justice Sotomayor argued that Congress intended to
codify comment k of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,165
which exempts sellers of '"unavoidably unsafe' products" from strict liability.166
In that context, the phrase refers to a handful of products, such as the
pharmaceutical products listed as examples, which have great social utility even
if they do pose risks to consumers. ' Further, Justice Sotomayor claimed that
when the NCVIA was enacted in 1986, courts interpreted comment k to require a
case-by-case showing that "no feasible alternative design would reduce the
safety risks without compromising the product's cost and utility."l 68 Because
Congress intended to codify comment k, and its "commonly understood
meaning" in 1986, Justice Sotomayor would have held that section 22(b)(1) only
preempts design-defect claims when the vaccine manufacturer can prove that no
feasible alternative design existed.169
3. An Evaluation of the Two Plain AMleaning Opinions
In our opinion, both Justices Scalia and Sotomayor reach plausible decisions
regarding the linguistic interpretation of NCVIA. That conclusion sets the stage
for an analysis of Justice Brever's purposive approach to interpretive issues.
Before discussing his opinion, however, we should mention another view of the
problem. Catherine Sharkey, perhaps the leading scholar on issues of federal
preemption involving tort law, recently reached a conclusion regarding the
substantive result in Bruesewitz that mirrors our own,170 but we believe that her
reasoning is deeply flawed. Using preemption analysis to analyze Justice
Scalia's majority opinion, Sharkey argues that in all but label, the majority's
165. Comment k states, in part:
there are some products, which in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially
common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging
consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful
death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding
the unavoidable high degree of risk .... Such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not dcective, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous. . The seller of such products ... is not to be held to strict hability ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cnt. k (1965) (additional emphasis added).
166. See Brueseiitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1089 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-22(b)(1) (2006); I.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 26, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A. N at 6367).
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k.
168. See Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1089 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia disputed
this assertion and claimed that "[c]omment k did not have a 'commonly understood meaning." See
id. at 1082 (majority opinion) (quoting id at 1090 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
169. See id. at 1089-90 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 26,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6367).
170. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Categorical Preemption: Vaccines and the
Compensation Piece of the Preemption Puzzle, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 643, 667-68 (2012).
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opinion is based on policy-laden implied analysis and not express preemption.1
She refuses to accept at face value Justice Scalia's statement that his opinion is
"the only interpretation supported by the text and structure of the NCVIA" and
that there is "no need to resort to" legislative history. We, like Sharkey,
disagree with Justice Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation, but we take
Scalia at his word. It is true that Justice Scalia goes on to discuss the policies
and legislative history that lie behind the NCVIA, but he makes clear that his
purpose in doing so is only to rebut the dissent's argument that legislative history
contradicts the conclusion he reached through plain meaning analysis.
Further, Justice Scalia's analysis of the intricacies of the statutory language itself
precedes his far briefer discussion of the legislative history and policies
undergirding the statutory framework.174
B. Other Examples of "Plain" but Inconsistent Interpretations
Both Justices Scalia and Sotomayor applied the plain meaning approach to
interpret the NCVIA, but they reached different conclusions. Although it
seems unlikely that two Supreme Court Justices could reach different
conclusions about the plain meaning of a statute, such inconsistency is actually
quite common when using this interpretive theory.
171. See id. at 667. Preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, which states, in relevant part, "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereoft] ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S.
CONST. art. VI. cl. 2. When a state law and federal law conflict with one another, the Supremacy
Clause demands that the federal law trump, or "preempt," the state law. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid
Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)).
There are three types of preemption: express preemption, field preemption, and conflict
preemption. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000). Express preemption
exists when a federal law contains explicit preempting language. See, e.g., Cippolone v. Liggett
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (plurality opinion) (analyzing the preemptive scope of an act
by looking to the express language of the act). Field preemption exists when a "federal law so
thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it.'" Id. at 516 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)): see also City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411
U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (finding preemption based on the "pervasive nature of the scheme" of an act).
Finally, conflict preemption occurs when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal
laws. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 82 (2000) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (stating that a state law would have "stood 'as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the important means-related federal objectives").
172. Bruesewiitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1081; see Sharkey, supra note 170, at 651 52.
173. See Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1081-82 (citations omitted).
174. See id. at 1075-80. 1081-82 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia's nearly five-page
discussion of the text and structure of the Act, see id. at 1075-80 (citations omitted), is followed by
his less than two-page discussion of legislative history. See id. at 1081-82 (citations omitted).
175. See id. at 1075-82 (citations omitted); id. at 1088 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
176. To be sure, the purposes and objectives approach can also lead to inconsistent results.
Compare, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1139-40 (2011) (quoting
Hines, 312 U.S. at 67) (using the purposes and objectives approach to find that a Department of
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A brief review of the Supreme Court's recent statutory interpretationjurisprudence illustrates the inconsistencies inherent in the plain meaning
doctrine. In Smith v. United States, the Court considered whether a defendant,
who had exchanged his gun for cocaine, "'use[d]' . . .a firearm 'during and in
relation to ... [a] drug trafficking crime"' in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A).' 8  The majority, led by Justice O'Connor, looked to the plain
language of the statute and held that the defendant "used" his firearm when he
traded it for cocaine.179 Justice O'Connor noted that although the term "use"
was not defined in the statute, the Court could look to its "ordinary," or
"common," understanding to provide the plain meaning. 1s Because the term
"use" was ordinarily defined as "to employ," the defendant "used" his firearm
during the transaction because he "'employed' [the gun] as an item of barter to
obtain cocaine." 8
Justice Scalia took issue with the majority's application of his conservative
plain meaning approach to interpretation and wrote a dissenting opinion.182 He
faulted the majority for its overly broad "common" definition of the word "use,"
claiming that the Court failed to "grasp the distinction between how a word can
be used and how it ordinarily is used."' 8  Justice Scalia used an example to
illustrate the majority's flawed plain meaning analysis: "When someone asks,
'Do you use a cane?,' he is not inquiring whether you have your grandfather's
silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall; he wants to know whether
you walk with a cane."14 Likewise, although a firearm can be used as a
bartering item, Justice Scalia believed the statute's plain meaning was limited to
its ordinary use "as a weapon."185 As such, because the defendant did not use
his gun as a weapon,1 Justice Scalia would have held that defendant did not
violate the plain language of the statute. '8
Transportation (DOT) regulation for seatbelts does not preempt design-defect claims), with Geier,
529 U.S. at 881-82 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67) (using the purposes and objectives approach to
hold that a nearly identical DOT regulation for passive restraint devices preempts tort claims).
However, we argue that such inconsistent results are less likely when one approaches statutory
interpretation as Justice Breyer does in Bruesewitz. See iifina notes 312 51 and accompanying text.
If, after a cursory review ofthe statutory text, congressional intent does not appear to be "plain," we
believe that judges should follow Justice Breyer's lead and immediately look to the legislative goals
of the underlying statute. This approach, in turn, will enable the interpreter to place the text in its
proper legislative context, thus helping to uncover the true "plain meaning" of the text.
177. 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
178. Id at 225 (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006)).
179. See id. at 22 8, 24 1.
180. See id. at 228 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
181. Id at 228-29 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2806 (2d ed.
1959)).
182. See id. at 242-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 230 (majority opinion)).
183. Id. at 241, 242.
184. Id at 242.
185. See id
186. See id. at 225 26 (majority opinion).
187. See id. at 241-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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The inconsistent results reached by Justices O'Connor and Scalia in Smith
are not an isolated occurrence. Rather, such disagreements over the plain
meaning of a statute have become increasingly common. In 2008, for example,
the Supreme Court interpreted an exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act's
(FTCA) waiver of sovereign immunity. 1 In Ali v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons,189 a prisoner claimed that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) negligently lost
his luggage when he was transferred to another prison. 190 The BOP claimed that
it fell within the "law enforcement" officer exception to the FTCA 191 which
preserves sovereign immunity for "[a]ny claim arising in respect of the
assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any
goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any
other law enforcement officer.
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, agreed with the BOP based on the
plain meaning of the exception. 193 Thomas, applying Justice Scalia's
interpretive theory, found that the word "any" modified the clause: "other law
enforcement officer."94 That phrasing, argued Justice Thomas, demonstrated
Congress's "expansive" intent to include "law enforcement officers of whatever
kind" within the FTCA exception.195
The dissent, led by Justice Kennedy, accused the majority of expanding the
196
plain meaning beyond customs and tax officers. Kennedy believed that the
combination of the first clause, which referred to the "collection of any tax or
customs duty," and the middle of the subsequent clause, referring to "officer[s]
of customs or excise," plainly illustrated Congress's intent to limit the exception
to customs and tax officers.197
Proponents of the plain meaning rule claim that by focusing within the "four
corners" of the statute, judges are less likely to be swayed by subjective
188. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 215
(2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006)). The FTCA waives the federal government's sovereign
immunity for torts federal employees commit. See § 1346(b)(1). In Ali, the Federal Bureau of
Prisons claimed that its officers fell within ain exception to the FTCA, thus presering its sovereign
immunity for any tort claims. See Ali, 552 U.S. at 217 (citing § 2680(c)).
189. 552 U.S. 214 (2008).
190. See id at 216.
191. See Ali, 552 U.S. at 217.
192. § 2680(c).
193. See Ali. 552 U.S. at 218 (quoting § 2680(c)).
194. See id. at 218 20 (quoting § 2680(c); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4, 5 (1997);
Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.. 446 U.S. 578, 584, 588-89 (1980)).
195. Id at 220.
196. See id at 230, 231 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
197. See id at 230-31 (quoting § 2680(c)). In statutory construction terms, Justice Kennedy
claimed that the esusden generis canon dictates such a result. See id at 231 ("The ejusden generis
canon provides that, wvhere a seemingly broad clause constitutes a residual phrase, it must be
controlled by. and defined with reference to, the 'enumerated categories ... which are recited just
before it' so that the clause encompasses only objects similar in nature." (quoting Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114 15 (2001))).
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influences.198 On the other hand, some commentators believe that plain meaning
judges are not immune to unprincipled judicial decisionrmaking. 199 Whether the
plain meaning approach prevents or promotes judicial subjectivity is a topic that
is open to debate. However, after a review of Bruesewitz and its predecessors,
we can note one thing with some certainty: the only thing "plain" about the plain
meaning approach is that it leads to a number of inconsistent results. That is to
say, ever since Justice Scalia brought his conservative, textualist ideology to the
nation's top bench in 1986, the Justices have reached a number of conflicting
interpretations when applying this rule. 200 Because the plain meaning rule does
not eliminate judicial discretion, as Justice Scalia claimed it did in justifying its
use.201 the time has come to adopt a more consistent, practical approach to
statutory interpretation.
IV. THE LESSON OF BRUESEW ITZ: PLACING STATUTORY LANGUAGE WITIN ITS
LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT
The debate between Justices Scalia and Sotomayor in Bruesewitz highlights
the obvious truth that the plain meaning rule yields inconsistent results. How
could two highly educated and sophisticated jurists apply the same interpretive
rule, yet reach completely different results? Because it is debatable whether
Justice Scalia or Justice Sotomayor presented a better textual analysis,
Bruesewitz demonstrates exactly why Justice Breyer's purposive approach is so
pivotal: it breaks the textual "tie" in situations like this. Understanding that the
textual analysis was a close call, Justice Breyer considered the purpose of the
NCVIA, thus placing the ambiguous text within its legislative context.20 Justice
Breyer noted that Congress intended to compensate children suffering from
vaccine-related injury through a no-fault alternative to the common law tort
system. 20 This led him to understand that if the Court allowed Hannah
Bruesewitz's claim to proceed in tort, it could effectively destroy Congress's
efficient alternative to the tort system.204
198. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 5. at 476 (arguing that the plain meaning approach
involves interpretive choices about "what rules to apply, what evidence to admit, [and] dictionary
definitions to invoke").
200. See supra notes 176-97 and accompanying text; see also Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel
Entm't Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 128 29 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 123-24 (majority
opinion)) (plain meaning debate between Justices Scalia and Marshall regarding whether Rule II
sanctions could be imposed against a law firm), superseded by statute, FED. R. Civ. P. 11, as
recognized in Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d. 1330, 1339 (9th Cir. 1995).
201. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511 , 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
202. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082-83 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
203. See id. at 1083 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 26 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6367).
204. See id. at 1085-86 (quoting Brief Amici Curiae of the American Academy of Pediatrics
and 21 Other Physician and Public Health Organizations in Support of Respondent at 24,
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Before discussing Justice Breyer's opinion, this Part analyzes the inherent
characteristics of no-fault compensation systems, with a focus, in particular, on
the NVICP.20 It then concludes with a discussion of Justice Breyer's opinion in
Bruesewitz, demonstrating that his understanding of how a no-fault
compensation system works helps validate his purposive approach to statutory
interpretation. 206
There is little doubt about what prompted Congress to pass the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. One manufacturer had withdrawn from
the vaccine market in 1984, and several others were suggesting they might do the
same.207 Insurance premiums for manufacturers had skyrocketed, and there were
concerns that insurance would no longer be available.208 Although Congress
acknowledged that vaccines had led to "great progress ... in eliminating"
childhood diseases, 09 it also recognized that in a few instances vaccinations
result in "serious-and sometimes deadly"-side effects.210  For victims and
their families, the common law tort system offered only "opportunities for
redress and restitution" that were "limited, time-consuming, expensive, and often
unanswered." " Despite the fact that "futures have been destroyed and
mountin expenses must be met," often no recovery was available within the tort
system. In the NCVIA, Congress turned instead to a no-fault compensation
system.
A. Shared Goals of 'No-Fault Systems
The goal of no-fault compensation systems is to benefit both potential
tortfeasors and injured parties through an administrative regime that replaces
costly, unpredictable tort litigation with a predictable, less-expensive method for
awarding compensation.214 No-fault compensation systems are based upon a
hypothetical quid pro quo, also known as the compensation bargain, 21 between
Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (No. 09-152)). Justice Breyer's opinion is discussed in detail at infra
notes 314 341 and accompanying text.
205. See infa notes 214 311 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 313-51 and accompanying text.
207. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 6. reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6347.
208. See id. at 6 (concluding that manufacturers "face great dificulty in obtaining insurance,"
but leaving unanswered the question whether this unavailability results from "a crisis in the tort
system or from a particularly bad downturn in the business cycle of the insurance industry").
209. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6346.
210. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6346.
211. Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6347.
212. Id
213. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa- I to -34 (2006).
214. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6348 (discussing H.R.
5546, 99th Cong. (1986)).
215. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of
WForkers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 800-01 (1982) (discussing no-fault systems with
respect to workers' compensation programs).
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potential tortfeasors and the injured parties. Unlike traditional tort litigation,
victims are entitled to compensation without having to prove fault or tortious
conduct on the part of injurers, 216 and without the fear that affirmative defenses
will operate as a bar to recovery.2 Instead, victims receive compensation
through a simple showing that they suffered injuries that fall within the
boundaries of the no-fault regime. In exchange for guaranteed compensation,
a claimant's recovery is usually limited to a certain percentage of her or his
actual economic loss )219 Moreover, compensation for noneconomic loss, such as
pain and suffering, is typically unavailable. 2 Thus, the claimant is assured
compensation, and the tortfeasor has the benefit of knowing the boundaries of
his potential liability, a pair of societal benefits that the less predictable tort
system lacks. 21
The compensation bargain can be examined more closely. No-fault systems,
such as the NCVIA, share three objectives. The first is to compensate as many
victims of harm-producing behavior as possible.222 These programs sometimes
cover repetitive injuries caused by manufacturers or other businesses. In other
instances, no-fault programs, such as automobile no-fault, require participants to
purchase insurance to cover the comparatively modest injuries-numerous in the
aggregate-that fall within statutorily defined boundaries. As such,
216. See id at 800; Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Workers'
Compensation Remedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405, 406 (1998).
217. See Epstein, supra note 215, at 801: King, supra note 216, at 406. During the nineteenth
century, the "unholy trinity" of defenses-contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the
fellow-servant doctrine prevented ain employee from recovering against his employer in tort. See
Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation "Reform," 50
RUTGERS L. REV 657, 669 (1998).
218. See King, supra note 216, at 406.
219. See id. at 407.
220. See id. One notable exception to this generalization, however, is the September 11
Victim's Compensation Fund, which allows for $250,000 for "presumed non-economic losses for
decedents" and "an additional $100,000 for the spouse and each dependent." 28 C.F.R. § 104.44
(2011).
221. See Epstein, supra note 215, at 818 ("The goal of the compensation statutes was that
uncertain remedies should be replaced by certain ones, so as to prevent litigation from becoming a
grotesque imitation of global war.").
222. See Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-Party Insurance: Advantages and
Problens, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 675 (2000).
223. See, e.g., Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-944 (2006) (compensating coal
miners and their dependents for the consequences of a disabling disease similar to tuberculosis
known as "black lung"): Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 766.301-316 (West 2011) (outlining no-fault
compensation plan for a narrow subset of claims resulting from birth-related neurological injuries in
response to arguments by obstetricians in the late 1980s that liability insurance was either
unavailable or unaffordable); see also Stephen Todd, Privatization of Accident Compensation:
Policy and Politics in New Zealand. 39 WASHBURN L.J. 404, 405 (2000) (describing New Zealand's
comprehensive no-fault accidental injury compensation system).
224. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL. BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE
TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 5 (1965) (discussing
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compensation as a goal of no-fault compensation systems is inextricably linked
to the related concept of loss distribution: the idea that "accident losses will be
least burdensome if they are spread broadly among people and over time."
The common law tort system, standing alone, does a particularly poor job of
fulfilling this instrumental objective. Instead, many victims are forced to absorb
most of their losses. This can be devastating: researchers have estimated that
less than 5% of economic losses are compensated through the tort system, while
victims are forced to "absorb nearly 40% of medical costs and two thirds of lost
wages.,226 Indeed, many victims are often precluded from recovery because
they are unable to prove a common law tort. For example, before the NVICP,
many vaccine-injured claimants were simply unable to prove that the
manufacturer engaged in tortious conduct,227 or that the manufacturer caused the
victim's loss.- In fact, this was one of the primary justifications for passing the
NCVIA: "[The no-fault system is] intended to compensate persons with
recognized vaccine injuries without requiring the difficult individual
determinations of causation of injury and without a demonstration that a
manufacturer was negligent or that a vaccine was defective."
how compulsory automobile insurance operates). See generally Schwartz, supra note 222, at 674
75 (evaluating the benefits and drawbacks of no-fault automobile insurance systems).
225. GuIDo CALABRESI, TiHE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 39
(Student ed. 1970). Justice Traynor explained the "loss distribution" objective of tort law in his
concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944):
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury
can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business.
Id. at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
226. See NEIL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND 1TALK ABOUT
ACCIDENTS 9 (2000) (citing DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL.. RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE.
COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 52-53. 80 (1991). available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ranid/pubs/reports/2006/R3999.pdf). The remainder, Feigenson
claims, is covered by first-party insurance and workers' compensation. See id. (citing HENSLER ET
AL., supra, at 53).
227. See, e.g., Schindler v. Lederle Labs., 725 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding
that warnings given by a polio vaccine manufacturer were "adequate" enough to defeat plaintiffs'
negligence claim); Percival v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 689 F. Supp. 1060, 1061, 1064 (W.D. Okla.
1987) (finding DPT manufacturer did not have a duty to directly warn parents of infant, who
"developed severe and permanent neurological damage," because of the "learned intermediary"
doctrine); Koehler v. Wyeth Labs. Div. of Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. NA 85-284-C, 1987 WL
47831, at *3-4 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 8. 1987) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k
(1965)) (denying plaintiffs strict liability claim for design defect because DPT vaccine is
"unavoidably unsafe" pursuant to comment k).
228. See, e.g., Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal. Rptr. 870, 880, 884-85 (Ct. App. 1983)
(quoting Sindell v. Abbot Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980)) (denying both "market share
liability" and "enterprise liability" claims against five manufacturers ofpolio vaccine).
229. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6353
(emphasis added).
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This system has ensured that many vaccine-related injuries are compensated;
since the no-fault system started receiving claims in 1989, 3,023 injured children
have received compensation.230
The second objective of no-fault compensation systems in general, and the
NVICP in particular, is to limit the liability of businesses or insurers, and to
make their liability exposures more predictable. As previously discussed, the
original impetus for the NCVIA was primarily to assure vaccine manufacturers
that they would not be faced with liability insurance that was either unavailable
or unaffordable. This is not surprising. Decades earlier, the National
Association of Manufacturers and other business groups came around to
supporting the adoption of the workers' compensation statutes because of
growing fears about the liability exposure of their members under the common
law system. More recently, physicians have advocated for no-fault
compensation systems to replace common law handling of medical malpractice
claims.234 Similarly, although many victims of vaccine-related injuries were
unable to recover in tort, 2 there had been a number of plaintiffs who prevailed
in the tort system and thus recovered large verdicts against the vaccine
manufacturers.236 The unpredictability of such awards, as well as their
magnitude, caused liability insurers to increase their premiums.
The third and final objective of no-fault systems is to significantly reduce
administrative costs when compared with the tort system.238 Together with the
reduction in the amount of compensation paid to each victim, these cost savings
enable a much greater percentage of victims to be compensated without a sharp
230. Health Res. & Servs. Admin., National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Data &
Statistics, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hrsa.govivaccinecompensation/data.
html (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
231. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 7. reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6348.
232. See id. at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.AN. at 6347.
233. See DOMENICO GAGLIARDO, AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 389 (rev. ed. 1955) (citing
F.C. Schwedtman, Principles of Sound Employers' Liability Legislation, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci., July 1911, at 202, 202); Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky Social Change and
the Law; of industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 65-69 (1967) (citations omitted).
234. See, e.g, Clark C. Havighurst & Laurence R. Tancredi, "ledical Adversity Insurane"
A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 MILBANK MEMORIAL
FUND Q. 125 (1973) (advocating for a no-fault medical malpractice compensation system); Paul C.
Weiler, The Case fir No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REv. 908, 910 (1993) (stating that the
traditional malpractice system has sent doctors to the "nation's capital" for relief in the form of
legislation).
235. See supra notes 227 29 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g, Toner v. Lederle Labs., 828 F.2d 510 511, 514 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming $1.1
million damage award against vaccine manufacturer for negligent design); Tinnerholin v. Parke
Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 452, 454 (S.D. N.Y. 1968) (awarding $651,783.52 in damages for
vaccine manufacturer's negligent failure to properly test vaccine and failure to warn), affd, 411
F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969).
237. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt. 1. at 6 (1986). reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344. 6347.
238. See DON DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAIKING THE
FACTS SERIOUSLY 393 (1996).
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increase in the amounts manufacturers and their insurers pay.239  One study
showed that before the adoption of the NCVIA, pharmaceutical firms expected
to spend between five and seven dollars to transfer a single dollar of
compensation to victims of vaccine-related harms.240 Even if these estimates are
high, studies by the independent RAND Corporation Institute for Civil Justice
(RAND) estimate that tort victims received only between 46% and 56% of the
total amount expended on tort litigation in 1985, while transaction costs ranged
from 44% to 54% of the total expenses.241 A later RAND study found that
products liability and medical malpractice victims received only about 43% of
all litication-related expenditures and that transaction costs accounted for
57%.24 More recent data show that as of 2002, asbestos claimants had received
approximately 42% of the total amount spent, with transaction costs amounting
to 58%.243
In contrast to the exorbitant transaction costs inherent in vaccine litigation,
the costs of administering the NVICP, according to the Congressional Budget
Office, represent approximately 15% of the total cost.244 Other estimates place
the percentage of administrative costs for the NVICP between 10% and 30%.
Further, because no-fault compensation schemes remove the time-
consuming, case-by-case determinations of fault necessary in common law tort
cases, they can provide quick compensation to victims.2 For example, a
1996 study showed that uncontested claims in the workers' compensation
system-the no-fault system that handles most claims of workers injured in the
239. See id
240. See Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood
Vaccines, 37 J.L. & ECON. 247, 271 (1994). These figures, according to Manning, were
conservative." Id
241. See JASs S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS
AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION, at xi fig.S. I(1986), available at http://www.rand.
org/content/damirand/pubs/reports/2006/R3391.pdf.
242. DEBORAH R. 1ENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE. TRENDS IN TORT
LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 27 fig.4.2 (1987), available at http://www.rand.
org/content/damrand/pubs/reports/2006/R3583.pdf.
243. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION. at
xxvi (2005). available at http://wwvw.rand.org/content/dan/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RANDM
Gl62.pdf.
244. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. TORT LIABILITY: A PRIMER
21 (2003), available at http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdoes/46xx/doc4641/10-22-tort
reform-study.pdf.
245. See James R. Copland, Administrative Coipensation for Pharmiaceutical-and-Vaccine-
Related Injuries, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 277, 285 (2011) (11% with 3% going towards attorneys'
fees); Robert L. Rabin, The Vaccine No-Fault Act: An Overview. 8 IND. H-EAL-TH L. REV. 269. 271
(2011) (between 10% and 30%o).
246. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a M/ass Toxics Administrative
Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951. 951 (1993).
247. See DEWEES ET AL.. supra note 238, at 393 ("It was thought that by relegating the courts
to a secondary role, compensation could be delivered to victims much faster and less expensively
than under the former system of tort liability.").
250 [VOL. 64: 221
HeinOnline  -- 64 S. C. L. Rev. 250 2012
2012] THE PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
course of their employment-were typically paid within about three weeks of the
date of filing248 Contested claims took a bit longer and averaged about four
months.249 contrast, tort claims handled by the common law judicial system
usually take approximately fifteen to twenty months to resolve. In other
words, on average, it takes at least four times as long for an injured claimant to
receive compensation in the tort system. The ability of no-fault systems to
administer claims promptly is a huge benefit for injured parties, especially when
the injury renders the victim incapable of performing her job.
B. Structural Overview of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program
Two major recurring issues must be addressed when devising an alternative
compensation system for product-related injuries.251 First, the no-fault
alternative must designate a "compensable event" to determine which claims are
entitled to compensation in the administrative system.252 Once the claimant has
established that he is entitled to compensation, the second major issue that must
be addressed is which parties are required to finance the no-fault system.
This Section provides an overview of the NVICP. It explains how the
NVICP addresses the recurring issues inherent in alternative compensation
systems by (1) using vaccine injury tables to designate a compensable event and
(2) placing the financial burden for the compensation on the vaccine
manufacturers.
1. Defining the Compensable Event
In any compensation system, the claimant must establish that her injury
constitutes a compensable event entitling her to compensation.254 Recovery in
the tort system is premised upon the plaintiffs ability to prove that the
248. See id. at 394 (citing I Amy. LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY: ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 119 (1991)).
249. See id. (citing AM. LAW INST., supra note 248, at 119).
250. See id. (citing Theodore F. Haas, On Reintegrating forkers' Compy1ensation and
Enplovers' Liabilitv, 21 GA. L. REV. 843, 848 n.23 (1987)).
251. See Donald G. Gifford. The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases Resulting
From Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REv. 613, 688 94 (2005) (citations omitted); Rabin, supra note
246, at 964-71, 976-78 (citing MARK A. PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE. RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF
AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES 6 (1988). available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2009/N2805.
pdf).
252. See Gifford, supra note 251, at 688.
253. See id. at 689.
254. See Rabin, supra note 246, at 964: see also Donald G. Gifford, The Death of Causation:
Mass Products Torts'Incomplete hIcorporation of Social FWelfare Principles, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 943, 949 (2006) (employing term "compensation entitlement boundary").
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defendant's tortious conduct proximately caused the plaintiffs injury.255 In
contrast, no-fault compensation systems provide recovery as long as the injury
falls within the statutory or administrative definitions of a compensable event,
thus avoiding the time-consuming, case-by-case inquiries into fault and
causation required by the tort system. 256
NCVIA established a no-fault compensation system for vaccine-related
injuries or deaths. The statute makes clear that a petitioner must first seek
compensation through the no-fault system before attempting to initiate a civil
action for damages against a vaccine manufacturer. As is true of most no-fault
regimes, the petitioner is not required to prove tortious conduct on the part of
the vaccine manufacturer.260 Instead, the petitioner must demonstrate that she
has suffered an injury, or compensable event, that is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative regime.261 A compensable event is defined by the "Vaccine
Injury Table," which lists: (1) the vaccines that are covered under the program;
(2) those injuries/disabilities "resulting from the administration of such
vaccines" that are entitled to compensation; and (3) the period of time following
the vaccination during which the first manifestation of the injury/disability must
occur.262 To establish a prima facie case for compensation, the petitioner must
demonstrate that she received a covered vaccine and suffered a "table injury"
within the proper time period.263 The petitioner does not need to prove
255. See Gifford, supra note 251, at 688.
256. See Rabin, supra note 246, at 964 ("[T]the jurisdiction of an administrative compensation
scheme is premised on the existence of an activity-related nexus between the claimant's harm and
the fund's obligation."). For example, workers' compensation benefits are provided to employees
for the following compensable event: "personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment." Epstein, supra note 215, at 790 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Worknen's Compensation Act of 1897. 60 & 61 VICT., ch. 37, § 1(1) (Eng.)); see also Gifford,
supra note 251, at 688 (describing the challenge of designating a "compensable event"); Rabin,
supra note 246, at 964.
257. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3 00aa-1 to -34 (2006).
Since October 1, 1988, all persons seeking compensation for a vaccine-related injury or death have
been required to file a petition for compensation in the United States Court of Federal Claims,
where the HHS serves as the respondent. See id §§ 300aa-l l(a)(1) to (a)(2)(A). Once this petition
is filed, it is forwarded to a special master wvho is required to issue a decision within 240 days. See
id § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A). There are two limited exceptions, which may result in a delay in the
special master's decision beyond the 240-day period. See id. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(C). First, either
party has a right to suspend the proceedings for thirty days. See id. Following the initial thirty-day
suspension, a special master may grant a second suspension, for an aggregate period of up to 150
days, only upon a finding that the "suspension is reasonable and necessary." See id
258. See id. § 300aa-I l(a)(2)(A) ("No person may bring a civil action for damages in an
amount greater than $ 1,000 ... against a vaccine administrator or manufacturer ... unless a petition
has been filed . . . .").
259. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
260. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a) (2006) (listing the compensable injuries the NCVIA covers
regardless of whether causation can be proven).
261. See id.
262. See id. See also 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(a) (2011) for the most recent Vaccine Injury Table.
263. See § 300aa-I (c)(1).
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causation.264 Instead, after establishing a prima facie case, the petitioner will
receive compensation for her injury unless the Secretary of HHS can
demonstrate that the injury was "unrelated to the administration of the
vaccine."265 Petitioners who cannot establish their compensation entitlements
based on the vaccine injury table-for example, those who suffered injuries that
are unlisted or occurred outside the coverage period-are not necessarily without
recourse. Such claimants may still receive compensation for "non-table"
injuries, 266-injuries not specified in the statute-if they can demonstrate that
the vaccine caused their injury.267
If the special master determines that that the claimant is entitled to
compensation, the claimant may recover damages for both economic and
noneconomic harms.268 Unlike most no-fault compensation systems, in which a
fixed schedule caps the claimant's economic recovery,269 the NVICP provides
economic compensation for an unlimited amount of certain actual and projected
"unreimbursable" 270 expenses, including medical and rehabilitative costs.271
Injured claimants may also receive compensation for actual and projected lost
earnings. Finally, all claimants, regardless of whether they receive an award
through the NVICP, are generally entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs.
When it comes to recovery for noneconomic injuries, the NVICP also
represents a departure from traditional no-fault systems that limit a claimant's
recovery to economic loss.24 The NVICP permits the special master to award
up to $250,000 for "pain and suffering" and "emotional distress" on account of a
vaccine-related injury.275 In spite of this "scaled-down discretionary decision"
for noneconomic damages, however, scholars have praised the NVICP for
"[assessing] damages in a simple and administratively efficient manner."276
264. See id.; id. § 300aa-13(a)(1).
265. See § 300aa-13(a)(1)(B).
266. Some estimate that up to 90% of the no-fault petitions filed are for non-table injuries.
See Betsy J. Grey, The Plague of Causation in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 48
IARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 345-46 (2011).
267. § 300aa-I I(c)(1)(C)(ii)(I).
268. See id. § 3 00aa-15(a). In the event of a vaccine-related death, total recovery for the
claimant's estate is limited to $250,000. § 300aa-15(a)(2).
269. See supra notes 219 20 and accompanying text.
270. See § 300aa-15. Thus, the petitioner's recovery is offset by collateral source payments,
such as insurance benefits. See id. § 3 00aa-15(a).
271. See § 300aa-15(a)(1).
272. See § 300aa-15(a)(3). The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund provided another
rare exception to the general rule that no-fault systems do not allow compensation for non-economic
damages. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.44 (2011) (entitling family members of deceased victims to a
"presumed" noneconomic damage award of $250,000 plus ain additional $100,000 for the spouse
and each additional dependent).
273. See § 300aa-15(e).
274. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
275. See § 300aa-15(a)(4).
276. See Rabin, supra note 246, at 959.
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After the special master issues a final judgment, the petitioner has two
options. The petitioner can accept the master's judgment, precluding her from
bringing a civil suit for damages against the vaccine manufacturer. / In the
alternative, the petitioner may reject the special master's judgment and file a
claim for damages.278  The NCVIA. however, severely limits a vaccine
manufacturer s liability in tort actions and thus discourages petitioners from
pursuing these claims. Specifically, the NCVIA completely eliminates the
manufacturer's liability for: (1) the failure to "provide direct warnings to the
injured party";2so (2) punitive damages, assuming that the manufacturer did not
engage in fraudulent, or otherwise illegal, conduct; and (3) damages resulting
from any "injury or death result[ing] from side effects that were unavoidable
even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper
directions and warnings."2 This third limitation, found in section 22(b)(1), is,
of course, the preemption provision at issue in Bruesewitz.283 As we know, the
Court held that this third limitation preempted a plaintiffs ability to sue a
vaccine manufacturer for alleged design defects.284
2. Financing the NVICP
Having discussed the compensation entitlement provisions of the vaccine
no-fault system, we now turn to the opposite side of the equation: Who is
responsible for financing this compensatory regime? As Professor Rabin
explains, "Typically, a no-fault scheme is financed through charges imposed on
those parties engaged in the injury-producing activity." The NVICP stays true
to this principle and funds the compensation system through an excise tax
277. See 42 U.S.C. § 3 00aa-21(a) (2006): see also Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 28. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010) (No. 09-
152) [hereinafter Amicus Brief] ("Department of Justice records indicate that 99.8% of successful
Compensation Program claimants have accepted their awards, foregoing any tort remedies against
vaccine manufacturers.").
278. See § 300aa-21(a).
279. See Rabin, supra note 246, at 959 (citing § 300aa-15(d); 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)-(c)
(2006); id. § 300aa-23(d)); see also Amicus Brief, supra note 277, at 28 (noting that 99.8% of
successful claimants accept the master's judgment and waive their ability to sue in tort).
280. See § 300aa-22(c). In other words, the NVICP adopts the so-called "learned
intermediary" doctrine. See Rabin, supra note 246, at 959 (citing § 300aa-22(c)).
281. See § 300aa-23(d)(2).
282. See § 300aa-22(b)(1).
283. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1075 (2011) (quoting § 300aa-22(b)(1)).
284. See id. at 1082.
285. Rabin, supra note 246, at 976. Rabin notes that "there is considerable divergence among
[compensation] systems" as to whether the assessment tunding the compensation system places an
equal tax on all units of an injurious product or whether such funding will be variable, based on the
risk-generating character of contributing enterprises." Id. at 976-77. As explained in the text, in
enacting the NVICP, Congress opted for the former method of funding, placing a $0.75 excise tax
on all vaccine manufacturers who produce a vaccine that is covered under the Act. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 413 1(b) (2006).
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imposed on all vaccine manufacturers that are covered inder the no-fault
system.286 A $0.75 excise tax is imposed on the manufacturer for each dose of a
covered vaccine;28 thus, for example, manufacturers of the DPT vaccine, which
protects against three separate diseases, must pay an excise tax of $2.25 for each
DPT vaccine produced. 8 The proceeds from the excise tax are funneled into
the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund,289 which holds the funds until they
are eventually distributed to victims.
C. The Importance ofEnf/brcing the Boundaries of a No-Fault System
The previous analysis shows that Congress had three objectives in enacting
the NCVIA: (1) compensating a much higher percentages of victims harmed by
the vaccines than had been compensated by the common law tort system; 291)
capping and stabilizing the liability costs imposed on vaccine manufacturers;29
and (3) reducing administrative costs. The ability to compensate more victims
and keep manufacturers' costs stable required that damages for any particular
claim be capped294 Thus, the compensation bargain, with its roots in the early
enactment of workers' compensation legislation, 5was transposed into the
vaccine compensation program.
However, the vaccine version of the compensation bargain would fail if
alleged vaccine victims and their counsel were allowed to choose between
pursuing claims under the NCVIA and filing common law tort actions. On one
hand, victims who were not able to prove the defectiveness of their vaccine
under strict products liability rules would presumably file under the NCVIA,
where such proof is not required. On the other hand, plaintiffs with a
favorable chance of proving a vaccine defect or other tortious conduct on the
manufacturer's part would elect to file a common law tort claim seeking to
286. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(i) (2006); see also § 4131 (placing a $0.75 excise tax on all
vaccine manufacturers wlio produce a vaccine that is covered under the NVICP); id. § 9510
(providing that the tax collected be appropriated to the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund).
287. §4131(b)(1).
288. See Health Res. & Servs. Admin., -National V accine Injury Compensation Program, U.S.
DEP'T HEALTH & HEM. SERVICES., http://www.lirsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/index.html (last
visited Nov. 3, 2012).
289. See § 9510.
290. See § 3 00aa-15(i) to (j). However, funds for compensating vaccine-related injuries
occurring before October I, 1988, are appropriated by Congress. See id.
291. See supra notes 222 30 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 238-50 and accompanying text.
294. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 39 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344,
6380.
295. See Jason M. Solomon, Note, Fulfilling the Bargain: How the Science of Ergononics
Can Inform the Laws of Workers' Compensation, 101 COLLt,. L. REV. 1140, 1145 (2001).
296. See generally 42 U.S.C. 300aa-14(a) (2006) (showing the vaccines for which
compensation can be received under the Program without proof of the vaccine's defectiveness).
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recover both uncapped economic damages and noneconomic damages as
determined by the jury. While victims would benefit, the vaccine
manufacturers' financial situations would be considerably worse than under
either the common law system alone or a vaccine program with strictly enforced
boundaries.297 They would face financial exposure both within the common law
tort system and in terms of assessments to fund the alternative system. Also,
their inability to quantify confidently the risk of future tort losses probably
would lead liability insurers-generally a cautious, self-protective group-to
charge even higher premiums than the absolute degree of financial exposure
warranted.
Whenever a no-fault compensation plan has been implemented, claimants
who believe they have a strong chance of receiving a larger recovery tinder the
common law have challenged the exclusivity of the compensation plan. 2 For
example, in Licari v. Elliott,299 a plaintiff who had been injured in a car accident
tried to bring a common law negligence action against the driver of the car that
hit him.300  The problem, however, was that the plaintiffs jurisdiction had
adopted a no-fault automobile insurance law.301 Notwithstanding that fact, the
plaintiff claimed that it was tip to the jury to decide whether his injury fell
outside of the no-fault compensation system and thus whether he was entitled to
sue in tort. 32 The court disaareed and held that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff
was not entitled to ste in tort. o
297. The result parallels "adverse selection" in the insurance marketplace. See ROBERT H.
JERRY, II & DOUGLAS S. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 13 (5th ed. 2012). For
example, before the enactment of the individual mandate to purchase health insurance, those
individuals with the highest health risks were most likely to purchase health insurance and the
healthiest, often young, individuals were least likely to purchase insurance. See generally id at 5 1-
52 (citing Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010))
(discussing how the enactment of the individual mandate affects insurance and noting that adults up
to age twenty-six are often uninsured). The net result operates to the detriment of the health insurer
and ultimately its policyholders.
298. See, e.g., Humana of Fla., Inc. v. McKaughan, 652 So. 2d 852, 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that plaintiffs had the right to have a common law court determine whether their
minor child suffered "birth-related neurological injur[ies]" within the meaning of Florida's no-fault
compensation system, which provided exclusive compensation remedy for such injuries within an
alternative no-fault compensation system); Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 433
N.E.2d 572, 578 (Ohio 1982) (upholding plaintiffs right to have a common law court determine
whether employer intentionally caused workplace injury, thus taking claim out of exclusivity of
remedy provisions of workers' compensation statute).
299. 441 N.E.2d 1088 (N.Y. 1982).
300. See id at 1089 (citing Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 892. § 8(4), 1977 N.Y. Laws 1, 7
(codified as amended at N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 5104 (McKinney 2008))).
301. See id. (citing Act of Aug. II, 1977, ch. 892, 1977 N.Y. Laws I (codified as amended at
N.Y. INSURANCE LAW §§ 5101-5109 (McKinney 2008))). See generally STEPHEN J. CARROLL &
JAMES S. KAKALIK. RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE. NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A
POLICY PERSPECTIVE (1991), for an overview of no-fault automobile insurance.
302. See Licari, 441 N.E.2d at 1091.
303. See id. at 1092.
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Significantly, the holding was based on the purpose behind the automobile
no-fault compensation system.304  The court recognized that the legislature
passed the no-fault regime to replace the "costly and time-consuming" tort
system with an automobile no-fault regime that "assure[d] prompt and full
compensation.',305 Thus, "to preserve the valuable benefits of no-fault[] at an
affordable cost,"3o6 claimants suffering injuries within no-fault's entitlement
boundaries cannot seek recompense in the tort system; instead, their only remedy
is through the administrative system: 307 "[I]jfthe procedural system cannot find a
way to keep cases that belong in no-fault out of the courthouse, the system is not
going to work."308
In essence. permitting a jury to hear a case that belongs in the no-fault
system would destroy no-fault's cost-effectiveness by "perpetuat[ing] a system
of unnecessary litigation.f309 No-fault systems reduce transaction costs,
permitting a greater number of victims to recover compensation, many of whom
would be unable to recover anything through tort litigation. o10  The increased
transaction costs associated with defending claims in court that belong in the no-
fault system, coupled with the higher compensation awards for cases heard
within the tort system, would destroy no-fault's cost effectiveness.311  That, in
turn, would render the goal of providing compensation to all injured claimants
impossible.
D. Justice Breyer and the Purposes of'No-Fault Compensation
The legal process issue in Licari-who should determine in the first instance
whether an injured claimant must seek compensation in the no-fault regime or in
the courts-is quite similar to the substantive issue posed in Bruesewitz: Is it the
alternative compensation system or common law courts that should adjudicate
most design defect claims? As we know, the Supreme Court held that Congress
preempted all state law design-defect claims against vaccine manufacturers, thus
' 12directing those claims to the no-fault system. In the process, both Justices
304. See id at 1091-92 (citations omitted).
305. Id at 1092 (citing 1977 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2448, 2450 (McKinney)).
306. Id. at 1091 (quoting 1977 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2450 (McKinney)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
307. See id at 1092 (citing Montgomery v. Daniels, 340 N.E.2d 444, 460-61 (N.Y. 1975)) ("If
it can be said, as a matter of law, that plaintiff suffered no serious injury within the meaning
of ... the Insurance Law, then plaintiff has no claim to assert and there is nothing for the jury to
decide.").
308. Id (emphasis added) (quoting David Herbert Schwartz. No-Fault Insurance: Litigation of
7hireshold Ouestions Under the New; York Stitute -The Neglected Procedural Dinension, 41
BROOK. L. REv. 37, 53 (1974)).
309. See id
310. See id at 1091 (quoting 1977 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2448 (McKinney)).
311. See id. at 1092 (quoting Schwartz, supra note 308, at 53).
312. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082 (2011).
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Scalia and Sotomayor applied the plain meaning rule to the relevant statutory
passages, yet reached polar opposite conclusions.
Rather than engage in a laborious textual analysis over the plain meaning of
section 22(b)(1), 31 Justice Bre er realized that such attempts to uncover purely
textual meaning were futile. Instead, because he recognized that the plain
meaning debate between Scalia and Sotomayor was a "close one,"316 he turned
his attention to the congressional goals in passing the NCVIA.3
After reviewing the relevant House Committee Report, 18 Justice Breyer
determined that Congress had two objectives in mind when it passed the
NCVIA.31 9 First, Congress "sought to provide generous compensation to those
whom vaccines injured" 320 without requiring the claimant to go through the
313. See supra notes 140-69 and accompanying text (discussing Justices Scalia's and
Sotomayor's respective plain meaning approaches).
314. The text of which provides:
"No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for damages arising from a
vaccine-related injury or death associated with the administration of a vaccine after
October 1. 1988, if the injury or death resulted from side effects that were unavoidable
even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper
directions and warnings."
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (2006).
315. See Bruesew it , 131 S. Ct. at 1082-83 (Breyer, J., concurring).
316. Id. at 1082. Justice Breyer explained:
The textual question considered alone is a close one. Hence, like the dissent, I would
look to other sources, including legislative history, statutory purpose, and the views of the
federal administrative agency, here supported by expert medical opinion. Unlike the
dissent, however, I believe these other sources reinforce the Court's conclusion.
Id at 1082-83.
317. See generally id at 1083-86 (citations omitted) (walking through Congress's goals).
Before discussing the congressional purpose in enacting the statute, Justice Breyer briefly
responded to the dissent's argument that Congress intended to codify comment k to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. See id at 1083 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 25 (1986). reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6366). Even assuming that Congress intended to codify the "principle" of
comment k, Justice Breyer noted that the legislative history is silent on whether a court or
administrator should determine the availability of a feasible alternative design and thus whether any
remaining side effects are rendered unavoidable. See id. Ultimately. Justice Breyer determined that
based on the legislative goals, an expert agency, not a court, has the authority to make this
determination. See id at 1085 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13 to -14 (2006); Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct.
at 1073-74; A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF FEDERAL VACCINE SAFETY PROGRAMS AND PUBLIC
HEALTH ACTIVITIES 13-15, 32 34 (2008), available at http://www.hhs.go/nvpo/nvac/doc
uments/'vaccine-safety-review.pdt).
318. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, pt. 1 (1986). reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344.
319. See Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1084. 1085 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-908 at 7. reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6348) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6,
24, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6347, 6365; STAFF OF HR. Comm. ON ENERGY &
CONMERCE, 99TH CONG., CHILDHOOD AiUNIZATIONS 85-86 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter
CHILDHOOD 1RIMUNJZATIONS]).
320. See Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1084 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6, 24, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6347, 6365).
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"expensive," "time-consuming" process of common law tort litigation.321
Second, Congress sought to stabilize a vaccine market where an increase in tort
litigation "prompted manufacturers to question their continued participation in
the vaccine market." Congress recognized that the withdrawal of more
vaccine manufacturers from the market "would present the very real possibility
of vaccine shortages," potentially causing a "genuine public health hazard."
Thus, Congress created a no-fault compensation system in which vaccine
manufacturers could predictably assess their liability, thereby providing an
incentive for manufacturers to remain in the market.324
These legislative goals led Justice Breyer to argue that it would be
"anomalous" to interpret the statute "as preserving design-defect suits,"325
because such an interpretation would destroy the viability of the no-fault
compensation plan, its effectiveness in capping pharmaceutical manufacturers'
32~6liability, and their ability to predict the extent of their liabilities. Thus, he
agreed with Justice Scalia that the NC VIA preempted Hannah's tort claim.327
Justice Breyer, however, made clear that he was basing his holding on the
purpose underlying the statute. He explained that Congress intended to fulfill
its objectives through an administrative no-fault compensation regime, rather
than the tort system: Justice Breyer explained:
To allow a jury in effect to second-guess [an administrator's
determination that an injured claimant is entitled to compensation] is to
substitute less expert for more expert judgment, thereby threatening
321. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6347. The House Report
acknowledged that injured parties frequently receive little to no redress in a tort system that is
inefficient, "time-consuming," and "expensive." Id. The report also acknowledged the need to
provide injured parties with compensation because:
[T]he opportunities for redress and restitution are limited, time-consuming, expensive,
and often unanswered. Currently. vaccine-injured persons can seek recovery for their
damages only through the civil tort system .... Lawsuits ... can take months and even
years to complete. Transaction costs-including attorneys' fees and court payments-are
high. And in the end, no recovery may be available. Yet futures have been destroyed
and mounting expenses must be met.
Id
322. Bruesew itz, 131 S. CL at 1084 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-908 at
7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6348) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing CHILDHOOD
IMUNIZATIONS, supra note 319, at 85-86); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-908 at 6-7. reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N at 6347-48 (indicating that as of 1986, there was one manufacturer of polio
vaccine, one manufacturer of MMR vaccine, and two manufacturers of DPT vaccine).
323. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1084 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-908 at
7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6348) (internal quotation marks omitted).
324. See id. at 1083-85 (citations omitted).
325. Id. at 1085.
326. See id
327. See id at 1086.
328. See id. at 1085.
329. See id.
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manufacturers with liability (indeed, strict liability) in instances where
any conflict between experts and nonexperts is likely to be particularly
severe-instances where Congress intended the contrary.330
Justice Breyer recognized that if the NCVIA is to have any utility at all,
injured claimants must seek compensation in the no-fault system, and not in the
tort system. If injured claimants can pursue tort claims, the NCVIA will not
accomplish its dual purpose of stabilizing the vaccine market and compensating
a much higher percentage of vaccine victims. Justice Breyer recognized that
Congress passed the NCVIA to prevent vaccine manufacturers from leaving the
market due to fear of tort liability. Interpreting the NCVIA in a way that did
not preempt design-defect claims would thwart this goal by increasing the cost of
liability insurance, forcing manufacturers to question their continued
participation in the market. 1
Moreover, Justice Breyer understood that Congress's second purpose in
passing the NCVIA was to provide "generous compensation" for vaccine-related
injuries.m The withdrawal of even a single manufacturer from the system, due
to the liability concerns discussed above, would disrupt this goal. Claimants
harmed by vaccines produced by non-participating manufacturers would be
unable to recover from the NVICP on a no-fault basis. Only those few injured
plaintiffs who could prove the common law requirements of fault and causation
would be compensated .
330. Id. (emphasis added). Congress recognized the inherent risk that when a jury is faced
with either imposing a loss on ain innocent, young child, or distributing the loss through ain innocent
manufacturer, it may be more inclined to select the latter option. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 26
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6367. The "authoritative" House Report notes:
[T]he plaintiff is almost invariably a young child, often badly injured or killed, and free
from wrongdoing. And, even if the defendant manufacturer may have made as safe a
vaccine as anyone reasonably could expect, a court or jury undoubtedly will find it
difficult to rule in favor of the "innocent" manufacturer if the equally "innocent" child
has to bear the risk of loss with no other possibility ofrecompense.
Id.; see also Copland, supra note 245, at 282 ("[I]n practice, the tort system's expost feature likely
exacerbates hindsight bias-the tendency to infer causation and negligence inappropriately given
injury-particularly when a decision-making body of unsophisticated lay jurors is involved .... ).
331. See generallv Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1083-86 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations
omitted) (analyzing why the no-fault system preempts tort suits).
332. See id. at 1085 (quoting Amicus Brief, supra note 277, at 30, 31).
333. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N at 6347-48
(describing manufacturers' difficulty in obtaining insurance); Stephen Engelberg, Maker of Vaccine
Quits the Market, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 1984, at A21 (discussing Connaught Laboratories Inc.'s
withdrawal from the DPT market due to high liability insurance premiums associated with the rise
in lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers).
334. See Brueseiitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1084 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-908,
at 6. 24, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6347, 6365).
335. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 6. reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6347
("Lawsuits ... can take months and even years to complete.... And in the end, no recovery may be
available.").
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Justice Breyer's purposive approach reflects a keen understanding of the
structure and objectives of no-fault compensation systems. He recognized that in
order to accomplish the congressional goal of compensating a large number of
vaccine injuries without regard to fault, vaccine-injured children must seek
recompense in the no-fault system. The no-fault system must be the exclusive
forum for design-defect claims, not simply an alternative to the tort system. This
is the lesson of Licari v. Elliott: "[I]f the procedural system cannot find a way to
keep cases that belong in no-fault out of the courthouse, the system is not going
to work."7
Subjecting manufacturers to both to potential tort liability for claims viewed
as strong common law claims and to assessments to fund the NVICP, from
which other victims would recover, would impair the congressional objective of
establishing a cost-effective no-fault compensation system. If claims of victims
such as Hannah Bruesewitz enter the tort system, either manufacturers will leave
the market, or pressure from the manufacturers will force lower assessments and
hence render less money available to compensate all of those entitled to
recompense in the NVICP. As Justice Breyer properly recognized, it is
necessary to divert all vaccine-injury claims to the no-fault system.
Preemption of design-defect claims will promote the goal of providing "generous
compensation"339 to a broad class of children, not just those who can prove a
common law tort. Admittedly, a few victims who allege they suffered harms as
a result of vaccine exposure, such as Hannah Bruesewitz herself, will be denied
compensation, but such a denial reflects the best judgment of Congress and the
experts the NVICP retains.
Finally, Justice Breyer reasoned, allowing a jury to "second-guess"340 the
no-fault administrator would destroy the cost-effectiveness of the no-fault
regime and "perpetuate a system of unnecessary litigation."3 Had the Court
supported Justice Sotomayor's view and found that the NCVIA did not preempt
design-defect claims, then manufacturers would be taxed twice-once for the
NCVIA assessment, and a second time for the liability premiums to cover
common law liability and the substantial transaction costs inherent in the
litigation process. Meanwhile, victims and their counsel would be able to game
the system and choose the approach that offered them the better probability of
prevailing and the larger amount of compensation. Congress sought to establish
a comprehensive compensation program that would make it financially feasible
336. See Brueseiitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1085 (Breyer, J., concurring).
337. Licari v. Elliott. 441 NE.2d 1088, 1092 (N.Y. 1982) (alteration in original) (quoting
Schwartz, supra note 308, at 53) (internal quotation marks omitted).
338. See Bruesew it, 131 S. Ct. at 1085 (Breyer, J., concurring).
339. Id. at 1084 (citng -.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6, 24, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6347, 6365).
340. Id. at 1085.
341. See Licari, 441 N.E.2d at 1092.
342. See Brueseiitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1100-01 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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for the continued production of vaccines, not to give victims the proverbial "two
bites at the apple."
Later in the same Term as Bruesewitz, the wisdom of Justice Breyer's
functional analysis prevailed when he wrote for the Court in Kasten v. Saint-
Gobain Perfbrmance Plastics Corp.34 3 Kasten considered whether oral
complaints were covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act's (FLSA)
antiretaliation provision, which prohibits an employer from terminating or
discriminating against an employee that "has filed any complaint."344 Breyer
quickly scanned the statutory text in search of a plain meaning. 3 He realized
that the plain meaning was not readily apparent because while the word "filed"
may "contemplate a writing,"' 4 6 the subsequent phrase, "any complaint," implies
that all complaints, both written and oral, are included.347 Thus, because Justice
Breyer quickly realized that "the text, taken alone, cannot provide a conclusive
answer," he applied a functional analysis to the FLSA.348
Considering the antiretaliation provision from a functional perspective,
Justice Breyer realized that Congress intended to enforce the FLSA not by
initiating proactive federal regulation, but by responding to employee
complaints. 349 Given that Congress wanted to facilitate employee complaints
about deleterious working conditions, Justice Breyer questioned: "Why would
Congress want to limit the enforcement scheme's effectiveness by inhibiting use
of the Act's complaint procedure by those who would find it difficult to reduce
their complaints to writing ... '?-T5 Unless oral complaints were included
within the ambit of the antiretaliation provision, the thoughtful enforcement
regime that Congress has established would be defeated.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the last twenty years, the Justices have fought an intense ideological
battle regarding the proper method of statutory interpretation. Since joining the
Supreme Court in 1994, Justice Breyer has actively opposed Justice Scalia's
literalist agenda. Justice Breyer, the liberal "counterwveight"3 to Justice Scalia,
favors a more pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation-one that does not
343. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
344. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (emphasis added); see Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1329.
345. See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331-33 (citations omitted).
346. Id. at 1331. Justice Breyer also acknowledged that the word "filed" can be used "in
conjunction with oral material." Id.
347. See id. at 1332.
348. See id. at 1333.
349. See id.
350. Id.
351. See id. Justice Scalia, of course, did not sign on to Justice Breyer's opinion. See id. at
1339 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The meaning of the phrase 'filed any complaint' is clear in light of its
context, and there is accordingly no need to rely on abstractions of congressional purpose.").
352. Dortzbach, supra note 24, at 182.
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simply consider the statutory text in isolation. Justice Breyer's method, the
purposive approach Professors Hart and Sacks advocated, and conservative
judges such as Friendly and Hand endorsed, seeks to understand the goals that
Congress had in passing a particular statute, and then interprets the statutory
language to fulfill these purposes. Justice Scalia is not interested in any of
this; he tries to interpret the words in a vacuum. This approach may work in
some cases, but it leads to misguided and inconsistent results when complicated
legislative schemes are involved. It is no wonder, then, that reasonable j urists-
Justices Scalia and Sotomayor-can disagree so vehemently about the meaning
of the same statute, such as the one at issue in Bruesewitz.
Such inconsistent conclusions, with potentially devastating results, can be
prevented through the purposive mode of statutory interpretation exemplified by
Justice Breyer's concurrence in Bruesewitz. When, after briefly reviewing the
statutory text, the meaning is not apparent without having to engage in a drawn
out textual analysis, the Court should stop, consider the legislative goals in
passing the particular provision, and interpret the text in accordance with these
goals. With today's complex regulatory state, considering statutory text in a
vacuum will not yield the true meaning of a statute, but considering legislative
purpose will. The lesson of Bruesewitz is clear, even if the language it construed
is not: It is time to declare Justice Breyer's purposive approach the winner in this
interpretive battle and put Justice Scalia's textualism to a long, overdue rest.
353. See id.
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